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DEMOCRACY, THE CONSTITUTION, AND LEGAL POSITIVISM 
IN AMERICA: LESSONS FROM A WINDING AND TROUBLED 
HISTORY  




This Article explores the political and philosophical background of 
the current debate between positivist “originalism” and evolutionary 
“living constitutionalism” and, more generally, the significance of 
positivist ideas for both democratic and constitutional theory. Noting 
the tensions between positivist and nonpositivist ideas that existed in 
early American constitutionalism, it focuses on the impact of John 
Austin’s theory of legal positivism in the United States after the Civil 
War and the way successive generations of Americans interpreted 
positivist ideas to develop their theories of democracy and 
constitutionalism. It argues that Austin inspired rival jurisprudential 
approaches that quickly, but misleadingly, became entangled with 
opposing theories of democracy and constitutionalism. Positivist ideas 
subsequently became the instrument first of Progressives who criticized 
the “Lochner Court,” then of New Deal justices who preached “judicial 
restraint,” then of many critics of the Warren Court, and finally of the 
conservative originalists in the present day who broadly condemn 
“liberal judicial activism.” The Article shows that, as American politics 
changed over the years, so too did the alleged significance and practical 
uses of positivism for arguments about both democracy and 
constitutionalism. The Article concludes that positivism contributed—
and is able to contribute—little to coherent normative theories of either 
democracy or constitutionalism but that it nonetheless has substantial 
practical value for both. Positivism’s emphasis on the social and 
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behavioral realities that underlie the law highlights the need to 
constantly examine the extent to which the legal system honors a 
society’s democratic values and constitutional principles not just in 
words and slogans but in the actual operations and social consequences 
of its legal system. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The current debate between “originalism” and “living” 
constitutionalism is the latest phase in a long and shifting history of 
jurisprudential conflict that traces to the nation’s founding.1 Although 
both “isms” encompass a variety of formulations, the nub of their 
disagreement is clear. Originalists argue that the idea of a written 
                                                                                                                     
 1. H. Jefferson Powell, The Original Understanding of Original Intent, 98 HARV. L. 
REV. 885, 887 (1985) (“[T]here was a tension [at the founding] between a global rejection of 
any and all methods of constitutional construction and a willingness to interpret the 
constitutional text in accordance with the common law principles . . . .”). The classic citation for 
the early debate on the Court over the use of natural law to construe the Constitution is Calder v. 
Bull, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386, 388 (1798) (opinion of Chase, J.), which argues that “the general 
principles of law and reason” limit legislative power, and id. at 399 (opinion of Iredell, J.), 
which argues that ideas of “natural justice” cannot invalidate a statute otherwise within a 
legislature’s delegated constitutional authority. See generally ERIC SLAUTER, THE STATE AS A 
WORK OF ART: THE CULTURAL ORIGINS OF THE CONSTITUTION (2009). 
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constitution and the principles of democracy demand that courts 
interpret the Constitution according to the meaning that its text 
conveyed to its drafters and ratifiers. In contrast, “living” 
constitutionalists deny that an originalist approach is practicable or even 
possible in many areas. They maintain that a written constitution must 
adapt to changing times and that the principles of democracy allow, or 
even require, that the Constitution’s broad and abstract terms reflect the 
changing values of the American people.2 
As today’s “originalists” rely on essentially positivist reasoning, the 
contemporary debate reframes and reargues two paramount issues over 
which legal positivists and their critics locked horns for the past century 
and a half. As a matter of constitutional theory, do the principles of 
legal positivism provide proper prescriptions for interpreting the 
Constitution? As a matter of political theory, do the principles of legal 
positivism support or undermine the values of democracy? 
That extended debate centered around four fundamental principles of 
classical legal positivism.3 The first, usually called the “sources thesis,” 
holds that “law” is necessarily based on an identifiable and authoritative 
source and backed by a sanction.4 That source is the “command” of a 
“sovereign” or, more recently, the decision of an official who follows 
                                                                                                                     
 2. For contributions to the current phase of the debate, see, for example, JACK M. 
BALKIN, LIVING ORIGINALISM (2011); RANDY E. BARNETT, RESTORING THE LOST CONSTITUTION: 
THE PRESUMPTION OF LIBERTY (2004); GARY L. MCDOWELL, THE LANGUAGE OF LAW AND THE 
FOUNDATIONS OF AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONALISM (2010); DAVID A. STRAUSS, THE LIVING 
CONSTITUTION (2010); Bruce Ackerman, The Living Constitution, 120 HARV. L. REV. 1737 
(2007); James E. Fleming, Living Originalism and Living Constitutionalism as Moral Readings 
of the American Constitution, 92 B.U. L. REV. 1171 (2012); Symposium, Debating the Living 
Constitution, 59 DRAKE L. REV. 961 (2011); Brannon P. Denning, Common Law Constitutional 
Interpretation: A Critique, 27 CONST. COMMENT. 621 (2011), reviewing STRAUSS, supra;  
Michael C. Dorf, The Undead Constitution, 125 HARV. L. REV. 2011 (2012), reviewing BALKIN, 
supra, and STRAUSS, supra. 
 3. The principles are those that most, but not all, “legal positivists” commonly advance. 
H.L.A. Hart notes that the term “positivism” is used “to designate one or more” of five 
propositions and that major figures in the history of legal positivism—Jeremy Bentham, John 
Austin, and Hans Kelsen—neither held all five nor held the ones they shared in exactly the same 
form. H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 302 (3d ed. 2012). On “classic” legal positivism—the 
ideas developed by Jeremy Bentham and especially John Austin in the late eighteenth and early 
nineteenth century—see generally J.M. KELLY, A SHORT HISTORY OF WESTERN LEGAL THEORY 
244–347 (1992); GERALD J. POSTEMA, BENTHAM AND THE COMMON LAW TRADITION (1986); 
WILFRID E. RUMBLE, THE THOUGHT OF JOHN AUSTIN: JURISPRUDENCE, COLONIAL REFORM, AND 
THE BRITISH CONSTITUTION (1985); ANTHONY J. SEBOK, LEGAL POSITIVISM IN AMERICAN 
JURISPRUDENCE (1998). 
 4. But see SEBOK, supra note 3, at 31 (calling it the “command theory,” and using 
“sources thesis” to refer to a combination of what this Article calls the “traceability thesis” and 
the “social thesis”). 
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procedures and applies rules “recognized” as authoritative.5 The second 
principle, essentially a corollary of the first, is the “traceability thesis.” 
It holds that, in order to be valid, any particular rule or decision must be 
“traceable” to an authoritative legal “source.”6 “Traceability” 
legitimates rules and decisions independent of their substantive 
content.7 The third principle holds that the authoritative legal status of 
“sources” and “traceable” rules—their claim to be recognized as law 
“properly so called”—is a question of social fact. This “social thesis” 
means that sources and rules are truly “law” only if a community 
generally recognizes them as authoritative and its members generally 
obey them as a matter of observable social practice.8 The last principle 
is that “law” and “morals” are distinct and should be separated for 
purposes of legal analysis.9 This so-called “separation thesis” does not 
mean either that law and morals are necessarily unrelated or that moral 
truth is irrelevant or unknowable. It simply means that the two realms of 
“law” and “morals” are different, and that confusion is avoided and 
“law” more precisely identified when analysts treat “law” as distinct 
from “morals.”10  
                                                                                                                     
 5. “Laws proper or properly so called, are commands . . . .” JOHN AUSTIN, THE PROVINCE 
OF JURISPRUDENCE DETERMINED, at 1 (Noonday Press “Library of Ideas” ed. 1954) (1832). The 
“command” theory has a long history that antedates by centuries the rise of modern legal 
positivism and the work of Bentham and Austin. See, e.g., Gerald J. Postema, Law as 
Command: The Model of Command in Modern Jurisprudence, 11 PHIL. ISSUES 470, 471 (2001). 
Hart helped shift positivism from its early and relatively simple “command” theory to a more 
sophisticated theory based on “secondary” rules which “specify the ways in which the primary 
[substantive] rules may be conclusively ascertained, introduced, eliminated, varied, and the fact 
of their violation conclusively determined.” HART, supra note 3, at 94; see id. at 116–17. For 
Hart’s critique of the “command” theory, see id. at 6–7. 
 6. See, e.g., SEBOK, supra note 3, at 31–32 (noting the substance of the traceability 
thesis, though conflating it with the social thesis). 
 7.  Viewing law more simply as a command, Austin largely assumed the principle of 
traceability. AUSTIN, supra note 5, at 133–34, 184–85, 228–30, 253–54. Recognizing the issue 
more clearly, Hart proposed his famous rules of recognition as an institutionalized method of 
addressing the necessary traceability requirement. See HART, supra  note 3, at 92–99, 100–01. 
 8. One of the hallmarks of sovereignty is “habitual obedience from the bulk of a given 
society.” AUSTIN, supra note 5, at 194. “So long as the laws which are valid by the system’s 
tests of validity are obeyed by the bulk of the population this surely is all the evidence we need 
in order to establish that a given legal system exists.” HART, supra note 3, at 114. See also 
Vincent Wellman, Positivism, Emergent and Triumphant, 97 MICH. L. REV. 1722, 1734 (1999) 
(reviewing, SEBOK, supra note 3) (“In Austin’s theory, that source was the will of the 
determinate sovereign and the social fact that the sovereign was owed a habit of obedience by 
the bulk of the populace, but in Hart’s version of positivism, the relevant social fact would be 
the acceptance of the rule of recognition by the officials of the legal system.” (footnote 
omitted)). 
 9. See, e.g., SEBOK, supra note 3, at 30. 
 10. “The existence of law is one thing; its merits or demerits are another thing.” AUSTIN, 
supra note 5, at 184. “Here we shall take Legal Positivism to mean the simple contention that it 
is in no sense a necessary truth that laws reproduce or satisfy certain demands of morality, 
4
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With those four classic principles in mind, the constitutional 
question—does legal positivism provide proper principles for 
interpreting the Constitution?—can be rephrased more specifically. 
Does the fact that the Constitution is the “supreme Law of the Land”11 
mean that interpretations of its meaning are valid only when they are 
based on specific provisions or principles incorporated in the text? Does 
American constitutionalism mean that the “sources” and “traceability” 
theses of legal positivism identify the correct prescriptive limits of 
constitutional interpretation? Further, are constitutional rulings 
consequently illegitimate if they are based on extratextual principles and 
values? Does American constitutionalism, in other words, also imply a 
recognition of legal positivism’s “separation thesis?”12  
Similarly, the question of political theory—does legal positivism 
support or undermine democratic values?—can also be rephrased more 
specifically. Does legal positivism’s “social” thesis mean that any rule 
or command obeyed and enforced as a matter of empirical fact is truly 
and properly “law”—no matter how evil, unjust, or discriminatory? 
Does legal positivism’s “separation” thesis mean that governments and 
their laws cannot properly be criticized “as law” on moral grounds? Do 
positivism’s “social” and “separation” theses, in other words, deprive 
“law” of any moral basis and thereby either negate the principles of 
democracy or render them irrelevant to proper legal analysis?  
As stated, those questions may sound bloodless and academic. 
Repeatedly, however, new national challenges, political conflicts, and 
constitutional crises forced them to the forefront. They address, in fact, 
some of the most fundamental questions of American law and 
government.  
I.  LEGAL POSITIVISM AND AMERICAN JURISPRUDENCE:  
A HISTORICAL OVERVIEW  
In a general sense “positivist” ideas played a part in American legal 
thought from the colonies’ earliest days. Those ideas came into new and 
far sharper focus, however, in the tumultuous years after the Civil War 
when the nation underwent rapid social changes and the ideas of John 
                                                                                                                     
though in fact they have often done so.” HART, supra note 3, at 185–86. Bentham insisted “on a 
precise and so far as possible a morally neutral vocabulary for use in the discussion of law and 
politics,” Hart maintained, and that insistence, “though it may seem a merely linguistic matter, 
was the very centre, and I would say the sane and healthy centre, of the legal positivism of 
which Bentham may be regarded as the founder.” H.L.A. HART, ESSAYS ON BENTHAM: STUDIES 
IN JURISPRUDENCE AND POLITICAL THEORY 28 (1982). 
 11. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2; see also id. art. VI, cl. 3 (stating that state and federal 
officials must take an oath to support the Constitution). 
 12. Some could consider legal positivism solely as a descriptive theory designed to 
explain how, in fact, some or all legal systems operate. On the normative qualities of classical 
positivism, see POSTEMA, supra note 3, at 328–36. 
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Austin attracted fresh attention from prominent legal and political 
thinkers. From that time forward the principles of Austin’s “legal 
positivism” were important, if controverted and often unrecognized, 
parts of the nation’s constitutional debates. 
A.  The American Context: Inherent Tensions 
The basic ideas behind the “sources” and “traceability” theses are 
characteristic elements of American constitutional thought. In contrast, 
the “social” and “separation” theses are not. From the beginning, then, 
American law reflected tensions between positivist and nonpositivist 
ideas.13 
Across the colonies, settlers sought to establish clear and written 
legal rules.14 Many were anxious to limit the prerogatives of colonial 
governors or local elites, while most recognized that the absence of 
established precedents meant that their communities could not rely 
solely on the slow development of an indigenous common law. Making 
a “fresh start,” Lawrence Friedman noted, “demands codification.”15 
Moreover, as disputes with England arose and recurred, the colonists 
often sought to defend their claimed rights and prerogatives by 
appealing to the provisions of their colonial charters.16 Then, as they 
gradually recognized the need for increased intercolonial cooperation, 
they produced a series of charters designed to accomplish that goal: 
Benjamin Franklin’s ill-fated Albany Plan of 1754, the revolution-
induced Articles of Confederation, and finally the Constitution itself. 
After Independence, too, they altered their colonial charters or drafted—
and frequently redrafted—constitutions for the governments of the 
individual states.17 In codifying their laws, appealing to charter rights, 
and drafting state and national constitutions, they pursued a kind of 
legal positivist enterprise, seeking to establish formal “sources” of an 
authoritative law that was known, written, accessible, and clearly 
                                                                                                                     
 13. For a discussion of the conflicting ideas and assumptions that lay behind the founders’ 
ideas of the sources of “rights” and the nature of constitutionalism in the late eighteenth century, 
see, for example, THE NATURE OF RIGHTS AT THE AMERICAN FOUNDING AND BEYOND (Barry 
Alan Shain ed., 2007), and JOHN PHILLIP REID, CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN 
REVOLUTION: THE AUTHORITY OF RIGHTS (1986). 
 14. “Colonial leaders everywhere sought the certainty of written codes.” KERMIT L. HALL 
& PETER KARSTEN, THE MAGIC MIRROR: LAW IN AMERICAN HISTORY 15 (2d ed. 2009). See 
generally STEPHEN BOTEIN, EARLY AMERICAN LAW AND SOCIETY (1983); G.B. Warden, Law 
Reform in England and New England, 1620 to 1660, 35 WM. & MARY Q. 668 (1978). 
 15. LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 50 (3d ed. 2005). 
 16.  JOHN PHILLIP REID, CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 59 (abr. 
ed. 1995). See generally MELVIN I. UROFSKY & PAUL FINKELMAN, A MARCH OF LIBERTY: A 
CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES (VOL. 1–2) (2002). 
 17. See generally JOHN J. DINAN, THE AMERICAN STATE CONSTITUTIONAL TRADITION 
(2006); CHRISTIAN G. FRITZ, AMERICAN SOVEREIGNS: THE PEOPLE AND AMERICA’S 
CONSTITUTIONAL TRADITION BEFORE THE CIVIL WAR (2008). 
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settled.  
At the same time, however, Americans never committed to the 
completeness and exclusivity of written laws. Many opposed 
codification in the name of an unwritten and honored common law, 
while others believed that written constitutions would inevitably prove 
incomplete or ambiguous. However carefully drafters chose their words, 
the “cloudy medium”18 of language never allowed them to convey all 
that would be necessary and desirable in a charter of government.19 
Many also believed that a “higher” law, natural or divine, reigned above 
human laws and conferred “unalienable” rights on all mankind.20 Thus, 
when they drafted and ratified the Constitution, they employed many 
general terms and immediately thereafter adopted two amendments—
the Ninth and Tenth—that affirmed the existence of unspecified “rights” 
and “powers.”21  
In the decades after ratification, Americans became increasingly 
aware of the tension between their written Constitution and their ideas 
of unwritten and higher laws and rights. By the early nineteenth century, 
especially after the War of 1812, they embraced the Constitution with a 
new fervor and conviction while still clinging to the belief that law 
reflected a natural or divine moral order.22 Slavery and the rise of 
abolitionism confronted those paired beliefs with a terrible challenge, 
one that only a Civil War and the repudiation of slavery in the nation’s 
positive law could resolve.23 
                                                                                                                     
 18. THE FEDERALIST NO. 37, at 237 (James Madison) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961). 
 19. See GORDON S. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC, 1776–1787, at 
291–305 (1969) (discussing the ambiguous nature of American law).  
 20. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776). See generally EDWARD S. 
CORWIN, THE “HIGHER LAW” BACKGROUND OF AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (1955).  
 21. U.S. CONST. amends. IX, X; see, e.g., KURT T. LASH, THE LOST HISTORY OF THE NINTH 
AMENDMENT (2009). 
 22. See, e.g., Alfred S. Konefsky, Piety and Profession: Simon Greenleaf and the Case of 
the Stillborn Bowdoin Law School, 1850–1861, 85 NEW ENG. Q. 695, 709–10, 717–18 (2012); 
William P. LaPiana, Jurisprudence of History and Truth, 23 RUTGERS L.J. 519, 524–27 (1992); 
Stephen A. Siegel, Historism in Late Nineteenth-Century Constitutional Thought, 1990 WIS. L. 
REV. 1431 [hereinafter Siegel, Historism] (indicating such by discussion of three great legal 
minds of the mid- to late-nineteenth century); Stephen A. Siegel, Lochner Era Jurisprudence 
and the American Constitutional Tradition, 70 N.C. L. REV. 1 (1991) (discussing the 
constitutional tradition before the Lochner era); Stephen A. Siegel, John Chipman Gray and the 
Moral Basis of Classical Legal Thought, 86 IOWA L. REV. 1513, 1527 (2001) [hereinafter Siegel, 
John Chipman Gray] (arguing that the Harvard faculty of the late nineteenth and early twentieth 
centuries “adhered to the view that law was deeply embedded in sound social mores and 
morals”). On the battle between advocates of codification and defenders of the common law in 
the antebellum period, see generally CHARLES M. COOK, THE AMERICAN CODIFICATION 
MOVEMENT: A STUDY OF ANTEBELLUM LEGAL REFORM (1981). 
 23. U.S. CONST. amend. XIII. On antislavery and positivism, see ROBERT M. COVER, 
JUSTICE ACCUSED: ANTISLAVERY AND THE JUDICIAL PROCESS (1975). Cf. William E. Nelson, The 
Impact of the Antislavery Movement upon Styles of Judicial Reasoning in Nineteenth Century 
7
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B.  Austinian Positivism Comes to Post-Civil War America 
The Civil War and the decades that followed marked a turning point 
in American history. Socially, a rural, agrarian, and decentralized 
society with a predominantly Anglo-Saxon Protestant population 
transformed itself into an urbanizing, industrializing, and centralizing 
nation with a religiously and ethnically diversifying population.24 
Economically, businesses organized into larger corporations that 
employed thousands and then tens of thousands of workers and 
conducted ever more expansive national and international operations. 
Intellectually, the era witnessed the controversial arrival of Darwinism 
and, more broadly, the rapidly burgeoning influence of science and 
technology. 
Those transforming events reverberated through the law and 
accelerated the organization and nationalization of the legal profession. 
Lawyers established state and local bar associations, and in 1878 a 
newly emerging national legal elite founded the American Bar 
Association.25 In booming cities across the land, lawyers began to form 
multimember and hierarchically structured firms designed to serve the 
diverse and expanding legal needs of the powerful national corporations 
that drove the nation’s economic expansion and centralization.26 Charles 
W. Eliot and Christopher Columbus Langdell brought a new rigor to 
legal education, drew apprentices away from lawyers’ offices and into 
the universities, and heralded both a new “case method” of study and an 
ostensibly more rigorous idea of “legal science.”27  
For constitutional law, four critical developments began to remold 
the legal landscape. First, the three Civil War amendments not only 
abolished slavery and thereby resolved a major source of antebellum 
tension between positive and moral law, but they also introduced into 
                                                                                                                     
America, 87 HARV. L. REV. 513 (1974) (discussing the shift from instrumentalism to formalism 
in judicial decision-making). 
 24. EDWARD A. PURCELL, JR., BRANDEIS AND THE PROGRESSIVE CONSTITUTION 11 (2000). 
 25. Norman W. Spaulding, The Discourse of Law in Time of War: Politics and 
Professionalism During the Civil War and Reconstruction, 46 WM. & MARY L. REV. 2001, 
2010–11, 2020–21, 2094–104 (2005). 
 26. See id. at 2023–24. See generally WILLIAM G. THOMAS, LAWYERING FOR THE 
RAILROAD: BUSINESS, LAW, AND POWER IN THE NEW SOUTH (1999); THE NEW HIGH PRIESTS: 
LAWYERS IN POST-CIVIL WAR AMERICA (Gerald W. Gawalt ed., 1984); Robert W. Gordon, Legal 
Thought and Legal Practice in the Age of American Enterprise, 1870–1920, in PROFESSIONS 
AND PROFESSIONAL IDEOLOGIES IN AMERICA (Gerald L. Geison ed., 1983); PURCELL, supra note 
24, at 17; Spaulding, supra note 25. 
 27. See generally BRUCE A. KIMBALL, THE INCEPTION OF MODERN PROFESSIONAL 
EDUCATION: C.C. LANGDELL, 1826–1906 (Daniel Earnst & Thomas A. Green eds., 2009); 
WILLIAM P. LAPIANA, LOGIC AND EXPERIENCE: THE ORIGIN OF MODERN AMERICAN LEGAL 
EDUCATION (1994); DAVID M. RABBAN, LAW’S HISTORY: AMERICAN LEGAL THOUGHT AND THE 
TRANSATLANTIC TURN TO HISTORY (2013). 
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American law the great and amorphous clauses of the Fourteenth 
Amendment and thereby laid the foundation for new tensions between 
positive and moral law.28 Second, the U.S. Supreme Court gradually 
ascended to a position of the highest authority. Its role in American 
government had been contested from the nation’s beginning, and the 
antebellum years witnessed bitter attacks on its constitutional authority, 
not only in the slave states, but in a number of northern states as well.29 
Despite the embarrassment of Dred Scott30 and its ostensible weakness 
during Reconstruction, however, the Court gradually emerged in the last 
two decades of the nineteenth century as an increasingly powerful and 
centralizing force in American government and the generally accepted 
authority on the Constitution’s meaning.31 Third, the paramount 
constitutional issues that came before the Court shifted from questions 
of federalism to questions of separation of powers. They involved, most 
critically, not the relation between central and state governments but the 
relation between the judiciary—especially the national judiciary—and 
the legislatures of both states and nation.32 Finally, evolutionary 
assumptions began to suggest that constitutions, like all other natural 
phenomena, were “living” organisms that adapted to their changing 
social environments. “The growth of the nation and the consequent 
development of the governmental system,” the young political scientist 
Woodrow Wilson wrote in 1885, “would snap asunder a constitution 
which could not adapt itself to the new conditions of an advancing 
society.”33 By the early twentieth century, some legal Progressives 
embraced the idea of a “living” Constitution in their critique of 
                                                                                                                     
 28. See, e.g., Akhil Reed Amar, Did the Fourteenth Amendment Incorporate the Bill of 
Rights Against States, 19 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 443, 443–44 (1996) (noting the tension 
between the Fourteenth Amendment as interpreted and its plain language meaning to 
nonlawyers). 
 29. See, e.g., LARRY D. KRAMER, THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES: POPULAR CONSTITUTIONALISM 
AND JUDICIAL REVIEW (2004) (recounting the emergence of judicial review in early U.S. 
history).  
 30. Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857). See generally DON E. 
FEHRENBACHER, THE DRED SCOTT CASE: ITS SIGNIFICANCE IN AMERICAN LAW AND POLITICS 
(1978). 
 31. See generally EDWARD A. PURCELL, JR., ORIGINALISM, FEDERALISM, AND THE 
AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL ENTERPRISE: A HISTORICAL INQUIRY 140–60 (2007) (tracing the 
rise of the Court’s authority as the generally accepted final interpreter of the Constitution); 
Edward A. Purcell, Jr., Ex parte Young and the Transformation of the Federal Courts, 1890–
1917, 40 U. TOL. L. REV. 931 (2009) (arguing that between approximately 1890 and 1917 the 
Supreme Court reshaped large areas of American law to expand the federal judicial power and 
increasingly centralize American government). 
 32. PURCELL, supra note 24, at 11–16. 
 33. WOODROW WILSON, CONGRESSIONAL GOVERNMENT 8–9 (1885); accord WOODROW 
WILSON, CONSTITUTIONAL GOVERNMENT IN THE UNITED STATES 193 (1908) (arguing that the 
difficulty of constitutional amendment leads to broader interpretations of the Constitution by 
courts than if constitutional amendment was easier).  
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probusiness and antireformist courts,34 while conservatives scorned the 
idea and rushed to defend both the belief that the Constitution enshrined 
unchanging principles and the authority of the judiciary, especially at 
the federal level.35  
In this dynamic new context legal positivism as a distinct and self-
identified jurisprudential theory arrived in the United States in powerful 
form. In 1861 John Austin’s The Province of Jurisprudence 
Determined, little noticed when originally published in 1832, was 
reissued, and two years later Austin’s Lectures on Jurisprudence or the 
Philosophy of Positive Law followed.36 Together, the two books gave 
the theses of classical legal positivism their most thorough and coherent 
presentation. Both Austin and his predecessor, Jeremy Bentham, were 
known in the United States before the Civil War, but—like other 
European thinkers who advanced positivist ideas—they had generated 
little interest and gathered few followers.37 In the decades after the Civil 
War, however, that reception changed. In the altered social and political 
context of the late nineteenth century, the ideas of Bentham and 
Austin—especially the latter—spread widely among lawyers, 
philosophers, and members of the educated public.38 Legal academics, 
in particular, as members of a new and unproven profession, seemed 
particularly attracted to Austin’s approach. It promised them obvious 
                                                                                                                     
 34. ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT AT 
THE BAR OF POLITICS 107 (1962) (Justice Louis Brandeis); Howard Gillman, The Collapse of 
Constitutional Originalism and the Rise of the Notion of the “Living Constitution” in the 
Course of American State-Building, 11 STUD. AM. POL. DEV. 191, 218–24 (1997). 
 35. ARNOLD M. PAUL, CONSERVATIVE CRISIS AND THE RULE OF LAW: ATTITUDES OF BAR 
AND BENCH, 1887–1895 (1969); PURCELL, supra note 24, at 16–19. See generally MICHAEL 
KAMMEN, A MACHINE THAT WOULD GO OF ITSELF: THE CONSTITUTION IN AMERICAN CULTURE 
(1986) (discussing the Constitution in American culture). 
 36. Austin died in 1859, and his wife, Sarah, brought out the new edition of The Province 
and then organized her husband’s lecture notes to produce Lectures. H.L.A. HART, Introduction, 
in AUSTIN, supra note 5, at ix. Ironically, Austin’s ideas changed substantially after the early 
1830s, and by the late 1840s “he was ceasing to be an Austinian.” LOTTE HAMBURGER & JOSEPH 
HAMBURGER, TROUBLED LIVES: JOHN AND SARAH AUSTIN 189 (1985). The fact that he did not 
publish widely later in life and was never able to revise his earlier works, especially The 
Province, largely obscured his subsequent change of views. Id. at 178–91. 
 37. “The outspoken positivism of Mill or Comte was virtually nonexistent [in the United 
States] before the Civil War.” DOROTHY ROSS, THE ORIGINS OF AMERICAN SOCIAL SCIENCE 50 
(1991).  
 38. See generally JAMES E. HERGET, AMERICAN JURISPRUDENCE, 1870–1970, at 82–116 
(1990); PETER J. KING, UTILITARIAN JURISPRUDENCE IN AMERICA: THE INFLUENCE OF BENTHAM 
AND AUSTIN ON AMERICAN LEGAL THOUGHT IN THE NINETEENTH CENTURY (1986); LAPIANA, 
supra note 27, at 76–78; SEBOK, supra note 3, at 20–112. On Bentham’s work, see HART, supra 
note 10, DAVID LIEBERMAN, THE PROVINCE OF LEGISLATION DETERMINED: LEGAL THEORY IN 
EIGHTEENTH-CENTURY BRITAIN (1989), and POSTEMA, supra note 3. On Austin’s work, see 
RUMBLE, supra note 3. On the influence of Bentham and Austin on Holmes, see H.L. POHLMAN, 
JUSTICE OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES & UTILITARIAN JURISPRUDENCE (1984).  
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and immediate professional rewards: a “scientific” method of analysis 
that legitimated their new role, a basis for claiming special authority 
vis-à-vis the practicing bar, and an appealing rationale for concentrating 
on relatively abstract doctrinal scholarship.39  
Three factors complicated the history and significance of Austinian 
positivism in America. The first involved the term “positivism” itself, a 
label both loosely applied and culturally loaded. In the mid-nineteenth 
century, many associated it primarily with the ideas of the French social 
theorist Auguste Comte who preached that humanity was leaving its 
“theological” stage of development and entering a more advanced 
rationalistic and scientific phase that would expand human knowledge, 
foster a new religion of humanity, and inspire widespread social and 
moral progress.40 In 1871 Comte’s followers established a Positivist 
Society in New York City, while David G. Croly, the father of the 
future progressive theorist Herbert Croly, published The Positivist 
Primer to herald the intellectual supremacy of science and the moral 
supremacy of humanity.41 Although Comtean positivism faded quickly 
as a distinctive movement, the growing faith in science and progress 
that nourished it continued to underwrite the continuing spread of 
naturalistic, evolutionary, and pragmatic ideas among American 
intellectuals.42  
Of equal—but quite discordant—significance, many associated the 
term “positivism” not only with popular ideas of science and progress 
but also with generally unpopular and sometimes hated ideas of 
irreligion. Comte scorned humanity’s primitive “theological” beliefs, 
and many Americans considered positivism a philosophy of 
materialism, relativism, determinism, and atheism.43 Such associations 
                                                                                                                     
 39. See NEIL DUXBURY, FREDERICK POLLOCK AND THE ENGLISH JURISTIC TRADITION 133–
38 (2004); Robert W. Gordon, Introduction: J. Willard Hurst and the Common Law Tradition in 
American Legal Historiography, 10 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 9, 30–33 (1975). On the change from 
early to late nineteenth century jurisprudential thinking, see WILLIAM M. WIECEK, THE LOST 
WORLD OF CLASSICAL LEGAL THOUGHT: LAW AND IDEOLOGY IN AMERICA, 1886–1937, at 38–41, 
89–93 (1998), and Christopher Tomlins, Framing the Field of Law’s Disciplinary Encounters: A 
Historical Narrative, 34 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 911, 913–46 (2000). 
 40. RALPH HENRY GABRIEL, THE COURSE OF AMERICAN DEMOCRATIC THOUGHT 183 (2d 
ed. 1956). 
 41. Id. at 183, 194.  
 42. See, e.g., ROSS, supra note 37; HAMILTON CRAVENS, THE TRIUMPH OF EVOLUTION: 
AMERICAN SCIENTISTS AND THE HEREDITY-ENVIRONMENT CONTROVERSY, 1900–1941 (1978); 
HERBERT W. SCHNEIDER, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN PHILOSOPHY 56–58, 67–76 (1946); DANIEL J. 
WILSON, SCIENCE, COMMUNITY, AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN PHILOSOPHY, 1860–
1930 (1990). 
 43. For example, in 1922 Roscoe Pound described “a positivist sociological thinking” that 
taught that “[a]ll phenomena were determined by inexorable natural laws to be discovered by 
observation. Moral and social and hence legal phenomena were governed by laws as completely 
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made “positivism” the despised enemy of those committed to religious 
faiths, “higher law” principles, or ideas of free will and human 
agency.44 Thus, to many Americans “positivism” was a brand of 
condemnation. 
Reacting to that negative connotation, those who embraced naturalist 
assumptions and scientific methods generally sought to avoid the 
“positivist” label and identified themselves, instead, as “pragmatists,” 
“empiricists,” “naturalists,” “instrumentalists,” or simply “scientists.”45 
Most of them, in fact, seemed to reject sweeping forms of Comtean 
“philosophical” positivism and scorned approaches they deemed rigidly 
materialist, mechanistic, and determinist.46 Similarly, those intellectuals 
                                                                                                                     
beyond the power of conscious human control as the movements of the planets.” ROSCOE 
POUND, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 54–55 (1922). 
 44. As Bruce Kuklick explained: 
Stimulated by August Comte’s “positive” philosophy, [John Stuart] Mill took 
an austere attitude toward religion, and few considered him a Christian. His 
simultaneous emphasis on the world of science made the word “positivism”—
applied broadly to Mill, Comte, and others—a term of abuse and contempt in 
many circles. In short, the Unitarians interpreted Mill as a champion of 
skeptical empiricism; he represented an anti-religious extreme.  
BRUCE KUKLICK, THE RISE OF AMERICAN PHILOSOPHY: CAMBRIDGE, MASSACHUSETTS, 1860–
1930, at 20, 85–87 (1977). Mill himself defined positivism as “the substitution of the scientific 
for the religious point of view.” Morton J. Horwitz, Why Is Anglo-American Jurisprudence 
Unhistorical?, 17 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 551, 581 n.160 (1997) (internal quotation marks 
omitted). See generally DAVID A. HOLLINGER, IN THE AMERICAN PROVINCE: STUDIES IN THE 
HISTORY AND HISTORIOGRAPHY OF IDEAS 3–22 (1985); JAMES T. KLOPPENBERG, UNCERTAIN 
VICTORY: SOCIAL DEMOCRACY AND PROGRESSIVISM IN EUROPEAN AND AMERICAN THOUGHT, 
1870–1920, at 21–26 (1986). Ironically, the intellectual roots of a narrower and strictly “legal” 
positivism trace to the writings of Martin Luther and Philip Melanchthon in the early sixteenth 
century. HAROLD J. BERMAN, FAITH AND ORDER: THE RECONCILIATION OF LAW AND RELIGION 
141–85 (1993). 
 45. William James was the most prominent and indefatigable of the naturalists who waged 
an extended campaign against deterministic positivism. See, e.g., WILLIAM JAMES, A 
PLURALISTIC UNIVERSE (Bison Books 1996) (1909); WILLIAM JAMES, PRAGMATISM: A NEW 
NAME FOR SOME OLD WAYS OF THINKING (1907); WILLIAM JAMES, THE VARIETIES OF RELIGIOUS 
EXPERIENCE: A STUDY IN HUMAN NATURE (1902). Innumerable efforts were made to reconcile 
science and religion in their various forms. In Christianity and Positivism, for example, James 
McCosh, the leader of American Presbyterianism and the president of Princeton University, 
accepted Darwinian evolution and argued that it did not contradict traditional Christian 
teachings. RICHARD HOFSTADTER, SOCIAL DARWINISM IN AMERICAN THOUGHT 26–27 (Beacon 
Press rev. ed. 1955) (1944).  
 46. E.g., THOMAS L. HASKELL, THE EMERGENCE OF PROFESSIONAL SOCIAL SCIENCE: THE 
AMERICAN SOCIAL SCIENCE ASSOCIATION AND THE NINETEENTH-CENTURY CRISIS OF AUTHORITY 
250–51 & n.22 (Johns Hopkins Univ. Press 2000) (1977). The early twentieth-century theories 
of “operationalism” and “behaviorism” were exceptions. Morris Cohen, for example, criticized 
legal positivism’s narrow focus on “facts” and warned of “the dangers of introducing the 
language of behaviorism into legal theory.” Morris R. Cohen, Justice Holmes and the Nature of 
Law, 31 COLUM. L. REV. 352, 357, 365 (1931). Responding to Cohen, the legal realist Hessel E. 
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who became Progressives in the late nineteenth and early twentieth 
centuries advanced ideas about democracy that rejected the kind of 
materialist and determinist assumptions associated with “philosophical 
positivism” and relied, instead, on pragmatic, moralistic, voluntaristic, 
and often religiously based premises.47  
Understandably, then, legal theorists in the United States shunned 
the positivist label. Those who adopted Austin’s approach and 
developed it systematically characterized their work, instead, as 
“analytical jurisprudence,”48 a term that quickly came into general use. 
The term “positivism,” in turn, largely disappeared. Revealingly, not 
until the middle of the twentieth century would the label “positivism” 
return to prominence in American legal discourse, and its revival would 
spring from a spirited new determination to exploit its old and highly 
negative connotations.49 
The second factor complicating the history of Austinian positivism 
was that it lost its distinct identity as it seeped through American legal 
thought. Commentators differed widely in adopting, modifying, and 
rejecting the elements of Austin’s jurisprudence.50 In the late nineteenth 
                                                                                                                     
Yntema rejected the label, vigorously denying that “legal realists” were “positivists.” Hessel E. 
Yntema, The Rational Basis of Legal Science, 31 COLUM. L. REV. 925, 946 n.62 (1931). They 
were, instead, advocates of an entirely different type of “empirical legal science.” Id.  
 47. Pound, for example, noted that sociological jurisprudence derived in part from 
Comtean positivism, but he insisted that it was a non-deterministic legal version of 
philosophical pragmatism. ROSCOE POUND, THE SPIRIT OF THE COMMON LAW 161, 212–15 
(1921). See generally RICHARD K. SHERWIN, VISUALIZING LAW IN THE AGE OF THE DIGITAL 
BAROQUE: ARABESQUES AND ENTANGLEMENTS 119–49 (2011); KLOPPENBERG, supra note 44; 
T.J. JACKSON LEARS, NO PLACE OF GRACE: ANTIMODERNISM AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF 
AMERICAN CULTURE, 1880–1920 (1981). 
 48. See, e.g., Charles Malcolm Platt, The Character and Scope of Analytical 
Jurisprudence, 24 AM. L. REV. 603, 603 (1890). Henry Summer Maine may have coined the 
term. See Wilfrid Rumble, John Austin and His Nineteenth Century Critics: The Case of Sir 
Henry Sumner Maine, 39 N. IR. LEGAL Q. 119, 119 (1988). Both Gray and Pound, for example, 
identified Austin’s ideas with “analytical jurisprudence.” JOHN CHIPMAN GRAY, THE NATURE 
AND SOURCES OF THE LAW 2–3 (2d ed. 1972) (1921); Roscoe Pound, Fifty Years of 
Jurisprudence, 50 HARV. L. REV. 557, 564–67, 577–78 (1937). On the linkage between 
Austinian positivism and American “analytical” jurisprudence, see SEBOK, supra note 3, at 39–
47. 
 49. Anthony Sebok suggests that scholars did not use the term in its revived and 
derogatory sense until the appearance of Lon L. Fuller’s book, The Law in Quest of Itself, in 
1940. SEBOK, supra note 3, at 39–41. 
 50. E.g., JAMES COOLIDGE CARTER, LAW: ITS ORIGIN GROWTH AND FUNCTION 181–82, 195 
(1907) (arguing Austin failed to understand the role of custom in shaping the law); Ezra R. 
Thayer, Judicial Legislation: Its Legitimate Function in the Development of the Common Law, 5 
HARV. L. REV. 172 (1891) (arguing that Austin failed to understand the role of courts in making 
law). See generally HERGET, supra note 38, at 82–116. Austin’s jurisprudence also exerted a 
major influence in England where it provoked extensive criticism and modification. RICHARD A. 
COSGROVE, THE RULE OF LAW: ALBERT VENN DICEY, VICTORIAN JURIST 23–28, 69–73 (1980); 
Richard A. Cosgrove, The Reception of Analytic Jurisprudence: The Victorian Debate on the 
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century “it was fashionable for every tyro to have his fling at Austin,” 
Roscoe Pound reported,51 and in 1894 John Dewey complained that 
commentators so distorted the Englishman’s original ideas about 
sovereignty that they created an “Austinian myth.”52 John Chipman 
Gray’s mixed reaction was typical. He praised Austin for articulating 
the “separation” thesis and rejecting the “declaratory” theory of law,53 
but dismissed his claims that the state was a “fictitious entity” and that 
courts implemented the sovereign’s “commands.”54 Oliver Wendell 
Holmes, Jr. similarly picked with care among Austin’s ideas.55 He 
agreed with Austin that law was ultimately the command of a sovereign, 
that it was distinct from morals, that it was a social phenomenon that 
scholars should study as a “science,” and that its compulsion arose from 
the blunt fact that “the whole power of the state will be put forth” to 
enforce its judgments.56 He refused, however, to accept other Austinian 
                                                                                                                     
Separation of Law and Morality, 1860–1900, 74 DURHAM U. J. 47 (1981); DUXBURY, supra note 
39, at 85–138.  
 51. Pound, supra note 48, at 558. 
 52. John Dewey, Austin’s Theory of Sovereignty, 9 POL. SCI. Q. 31, 31 (1894). 
 53. GRAY, supra note 48, at 94–95, 222. 
 54. Id. at 65–67, 88. Similarly, Gray emphasized the discretion that judges enjoyed in 
construing statutes. Id. at 170–87. “While Gray is commonly considered to be a forerunner of 
American legal realism, his jurisprudential perspective in fact fits far more squarely within the 
tradition of Austinian positivism. Considered thus, Gray, like Holmes, can be conceived equally 
to be an anti-formalist and a formalist.” NEIL DUXBURY, PATTERNS OF AMERICAN 
JURISPRUDENCE 53 (1995). “Gray essentially accepts the Austinian analysis as a helpful 
clarification of terminology, but with a mild skepticism toward its theoretical pretensions.” 
HERGET, supra note 38, at 97; see also id. at 149–50, 153 (describing Gray’s criticism). 
 55. “Holmes agreed with Austin’s objectives but disagreed with most of his specifics.” 
HERGET, supra note 38, at 38; see RICHARD A. COSGROVE, OUR LADY THE COMMON LAW: AN 
ANGLO-AMERICAN LEGAL COMMUNITY, 1870–1930, at 110–27, 129–30 n.66 (1987); Martin P. 
Golding, Holmes’s Jurisprudence: Aspects of Its Development and Continuity, 5 SOC. THEORY 
& PRAC. 183, 185–92 (1979). Holmes read Austin in 1861 and was about to read Hobbes when 
he was called to war, and between 1863 and 1871, he read Austin five more times. MARK 
DEWOLFE HOWE, JUSTICE OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES: THE SHAPING YEARS, 1841–1870, at 76–
77, 194 n.d (1957). “The Austinian strain in Holmes’s thought was vigorous and persistent,” 
possibly in some part because of his Civil War experience. Id. at 194. Holmes’ emphasis on the 
legislative policy basis of judicial decisions and the impact that outside social forces had on the 
evolution of legal doctrine were two of Holmes’ principal contributions to American 
jurisprudence. Both of those ideas seem in some tension with Austin’s jurisprudence. 
 56. OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR., The Path of the Law, in COLLECTED LEGAL PAPERS 
167 (1920).  
The scope of state sovereignty is a question of fact. It asserts itself as 
omnipotent in the sense that it asserts that what it sees fit to order it will make 
you obey. You may very well argue that it ought not to order certain things, and 
I agree. But if the government of England or any other first class European 
power, or, under a changed Constitution, the Congress of the U.S., does see fit 
to order them, I conceive that order is as much law as any other—not merely 
from the point of view of the Court, which of course will obey it—but from any 
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ideas. He adopted a broader and simpler theory of tort liability,57 gave 
greater emphasis to the role of both historical evolution and judgments 
of policy in shaping the law, dismissed the view that civil liability 
depended on a party’s state of mind,58 rejected Austin’s picture of the 
judicial process as wholly rational and deductive,59 and scorned his 
belief in the supremacy of a “Divine law.” By 1937 Albert Kocourek 
concluded that, overall, Austin’s ideas had met “violent criticism” in 
America. Although he titled his study “The Century of Analytic 
Jurisprudence Since John Austin,” Kocourek told the story not of Austin 
as the fountainhead of a movement but of the subsequent theorists who 
transformed, enriched, and sharpened the ideas Austin had sketched. 
“The brilliance of [the century’s] ending,” Kocourek declared in  
disparaging the Englishman, “stands in marked contrast to the dismal 
aspects of its beginning.”60 
                                                                                                                     
other rational point of view—if as would be the case, the government had the 
physical power to enforce its command. Law also as well as sovereignty is a 
fact. If in fact Catholics or atheists are proscribed and the screws put on, it 
seems to me idle to say that it is not law because by a theory that you and I 
happen to hold (though I think it very disputable) it ought not to be. 
Letter from Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. to Harold J. Laski (Sept. 15, 1916), in 1 HOLMES-LASKI 
LETTERS: THE CORRESPONDENCE OF MR. JUSTICE HOLMES AND HAROLD J. LASKI, 1916–1925, at 
21 (Mark DeWolfe Howe ed., 1953). 
 57. POHLMAN, supra note 38, at 45–47.  
Following Austin, Holmes supposed that tort law was about duties imposed and 
enforced by the sovereign as against its subjects through the courts. Unlike 
either Blackstone or Austin, however, Holmes supposed that the imposition of 
sanctions through private suits had nothing to do with breaches of “relative” or 
“relational” duties owed by one person to others, and indeed nothing 
whatsoever to do with wrongs. Indeed, Holmes criticized Austin for being 
insufficiently positivistic and overly moralistic in supposing that modern law 
would be interested in what he took to be the somewhat childish and barbaric 
practices of blaming, retaliating, and punishing on the basis of wrongdoing. 
John C.P. Goldberg, Two Conceptions of Tort Damages: Fair v. Full Compensation, 55 
DEPAUL L. REV. 435, 464 (2006) (footnotes omitted). Holmes rejected Austin’s distinction 
“between ‘relational’ and ‘absolute’ duties” as the basis for distinguishing between tort and 
criminal law, and instead “focused on the nature of the consequence that the state had attached 
to unreasonable conduct in these two classes of legal proceedings.” Id. at 465. 
 58. OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 67, 85–88 (1881).  
 59. “Austin and the realists developed both similar and contrasting ideas about judicial 
legislation. The most notable contrast may be their divergent accounts of how judges reach 
decisions. Austin’s description of this process assumes that it is highly rational, an assumption 
which a number of realists explicitly criticized.” Wilfrid E. Rumble, The Legal Positivism of 
John Austin and the Realist Movement in American Jurisprudence, 66 CORNELL L. REV. 986, 
1017 (1981). 
 60. Albert Kocourek, The Century of Analytic Jurisprudence Since John Austin, in 2 LAW: 
A CENTURY OF PROGRESS, 1835–1935, at 195, 221 (Alison Reppy ed., 1937). Kocourek 
identified Austin vaguely as but “one of the founders of analytic jurisprudence,” id., and added 
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More important, Austinian jurisprudence lost its identity during the 
late nineteenth century because Americans developed its implications 
along two divergent lines, and their efforts gave rise to ostensibly rival 
movements that submerged and superseded their common inspiration. 
One line of development, identified by the label of “analytical” 
jurisprudence, drew on Austin’s systematic rational method, accepted 
the principle that law and morals were separate, emphasized the 
importance of clarifying legal concepts and categories, and sought to 
organize doctrine into ordered sets of internally consistent principles 
and rules. Harvard’s dean, Christopher Columbus Langdell, emerged as 
the leading proponent of this “analytical” approach, which also became 
known to its subsequent critics as “Langdellianism,” “conceptualism,” 
“formalism,” and eventually “mechanical” jurisprudence.61 The other 
line of development, whose varying strains were subsequently 
characterized as “sociological,” “realist,” “pragmatic,” and 
“functionalist” jurisprudence, agreed with the “analytical” school that 
law and morals should be separated for study but spurned its 
methodological approach as abstract, deductive, and out of touch with 
real-world problems.62 Woodrow Wilson sounded the theme of those 
who rejected Langdell’s “analytic” jurisprudence. “[T]he latest writers 
of the Austinian school,” he charged in 1893, “have reduced 
jurisprudence to a merely formal science, professing to care nothing for 
the actual manner in which law may originate . . . .”63 Sociological 
jurists emphasized different elements of Austin’s jurisprudence—the 
“social” character of law, the importance of behavioral compliance, and 
the necessity of enforcement sanctions—and argued that law was an 
evolving human phenomenon that could be understood only 
contextually and empirically.64 Holmes famously highlighted the charge 
                                                                                                                     
in a footnote that it was “not improbable that Bentham must be put down as the originator of 
analytic jurisprudence,” id. at 230 n.150. 
 61. “The most thoroughgoing attempt to apply” a rigorously consistent theory of contract 
“to be found in the books is Langdell’s working out of a system of the so-called conditions 
implied in law or dependent promises on that basis. As an example of vigorous legal analysis it 
rivals Austin.” POUND, supra note 43, at 259. See generally KIMBALL, supra note 27; LAPIANA, 
supra note 27, at 77–78, 122–24; SEBOK, supra note 3; Thomas C. Grey, Langdell’s Orthodoxy, 
45 U. PITT. L. REV. 1 (1983); M.H. Hoeflich, Law & Geometry: Legal Science from Leibniz to 
Langdell, 30 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 95 (1986). 
 62. See, e.g., Rumble, supra note 59. 
 63. WOODROW WILSON, AN OLD MASTER AND OTHER POLITICAL ESSAYS 68–69 (1893). 
Roscoe Pound and Morris Cohen voiced another criticism typical of the “sociological” school. 
The “analytic jurist” presupposes “the possibility of a complete body of legal rules sufficient for 
every case,” Pound declared, but “all legal experience has demonstrated its futility.” ROSCOE 
POUND, THE FORMATIVE ERA OF AMERICAN LAW 112 (1950); accord Morris R. Cohen, 
Positivism and the Limits of Idealism in the Law, 27 COLUM. L. REV. 237, 238 (1927). 
 64. The “sociological” and “realist” strains drew not only on Austinian ideas but also on 
other schools of jurisprudence, such as the “historical” school of Savigny and Maine, as well as 
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of abstractionism in 1880 when he termed Langdell “the greatest living 
theologian” of American law,65 and he quickly emerged as the oracle of 
the rival “sociological” line. By the 1930s, when Morris R. Cohen 
sketched the history of American legal philosophy, he barely mentioned 
Austin and his “positive jurisprudence”66 but focused, instead, on the 
struggle between “Langdell and His School” on one side and Holmes 
and the varieties of sociological jurisprudence on the other.67 
Of course, neither of the two wings of American jurisprudence was 
monolithic. While Langdell reshaped legal education and attracted 
many admirers, a number of them—including members of his own 
Harvard faculty—disagreed with various elements of his approach.68 
Gray, for example, stood with a foot in each of the two opposed camps, 
accepting Langdell’s analytical method and doctrinal focus but giving 
far greater weight to practical considerations of policy and the de facto 
influence of moral ideas.69 Indeed, Langdell himself was hardly the 
purely abstract “conceptualist” that his critics pictured.70 Similarly, 
those thinkers labeled “sociological” and “realist” were even more 
notoriously diverse. “[I]t is rather difficult,” Cohen concluded, “to 
                                                                                                                     
on general “scientific,” “empiricist,” and “experiential” approaches that spread across American 
intellectual life. See generally DUXBURY, supra note 54, at 9–64; LaPiana, supra note 22; David 
M. Rabban, The Historiography of Late Nineteenth-Century American Legal History, 4 
THEORETICAL INQ. L. 541 (2003). The roots of the sociological and realist strains were far more 
complex than many realized. Cf. SHERWIN, supra note 47, at 122–38. 
 65. Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., Book Notices, 14 AM. L. REV. 233, 234 (1880). For a 
critique of Holmes’s attack on Langdell, including later criticisms in the mid-1890s, see 
KIMBALL, supra note 27, at 108–11, 125–28, 327–29. 
 66. Morris R. Cohen, A Critical Sketch of Legal Philosophy in America, in 2 LAW: A 
CENTURY OF PROGRESS, 1835–1935, at 266 (Alison Reppy ed., 1937). Cohen stated that “most of 
[Bentham’s] ideas came to us rather through Austin,” and compared Langdell to Austin by 
noting that “neither [Langdell] nor any of his followers went beyond the Austinian system of 
legal categories.” Id. at 284, 288. 
 67. Id. at 287–96 (“Langdell and His School”); id. at 296–314 (discussing Pound, Holmes, 
realism, and functionalism). Speaking of Langdell, Cohen wrote: “The neglect of the social-
economic factors that actually mold legal as well as other institutions naturally went together 
with the tendency to elevate into the rank of fixed principles legal rules that are by no means 
universally valid but can be more appropriately explained by reference to specific historical 
conditions.” Id. at 289. In contrast, Cohen commended “the essential soundness of Holmes’s 
main views on the nature of law” and the “enduring quality” of his work. Id. at 302. He praised 
Holmes as “a realist,” the “author of the greatest legal classic that this country has produced,” 
and the inspiration for “the latest school of American jurisprudence.” Id. at 300–02.  
 68. Some prominent and “conservative” jurists, for example, continued to retain natural 
law ideas as part of their jurisprudence. See, e.g., Siegel, Historism, supra note 22; Siegel, John 
Chipman Gray, supra note 22. See generally KIMBALL, supra note 27, at 193–232, 264–308. 
 69. See generally Siegel, John Chipman Gray, supra note 22.  
 70. KUNAL M. PARKER, COMMON LAW, HISTORY, AND DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA, 1790–
1900: LEGAL THOUGHT BEFORE MODERNISM 247–69 (2011); KIMBALL, supra note 27, at 121–29; 
LAPIANA, supra note 27, at 55–78; Bruce A. Kimball, The Langdell Problem: Historicizing the 
Century of Historiography, 1906–2000s, 22 LAW & HIST. REV. 277 (2004).  
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formulate any positive doctrine on which they all agree.”71 Karl 
Llewellyn and Jerome Frank, for example, who became two of the 
leading “realists” in the 1930s, rejected the type of codification that 
Austin favored but disagreed between themselves on both the 
desirability of codes and the extent to which codification could clarify 
and stabilize the law.72 
The third factor that complicated the history of Austinian positivism 
in America was the way its competing Langdellian and Holmesian 
strains became linked to the nation’s constitutional politics. As a matter 
of logic and theory, Austin’s jurisprudence answered none of the legal 
and constitutional questions that wracked the United States during the 
late nineteenth and early twentieth century. The variety of 
jurisprudential views that blossomed among those who drew on his 
work evidenced the indeterminate quality of his ideas in terms of 
choosing among the substantive policies that struggled for public 
acceptance.73 Yet, as the contrasting images of a “conceptualistic,” 
“formalistic,” and “mechanical” Langdellian jurisprudence on one side 
and a “sociological,” “realist,” and “functional” Holmesian 
jurisprudence on the other crystallized and began to circulate, legal and 
political writers came to see the two divergent approaches as rival 
theories that supported opposed political and constitutional positions. 
                                                                                                                     
 71. Cohen, supra note 66, at 303. H.L.A. Hart agreed: “But in what did the realism of the 
Realists consist? I find it very difficult to say because this active group of jurists differed from 
as much as they resembled each other.” H.L.A. HART, ESSAYS IN JURISPRUDENCE AND 
PHILOSOPHY 131 (1983). See generally N.E.H. Hull, Networks & Bricolage: A Prolegomenon to 
a History of Twentieth-Century American Academic Jurisprudence, 35 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 307 
(1991); N.E.H. Hull, Some Realism About the Llewellyn-Pound Exchange over Realism: The 
Newly Uncovered Private Correspondence, 1927–1931, 1987 WIS. L. REV. 921. 
 72. Rumble, supra note 59, at 1024–25. 
 73. The attitudes of the founders of jurisprudential positivism—Hobbes, Bentham, and 
Austin—illustrate the range of political views that can coexist with positivist ideas. Hobbes, the 
most extreme case, was neither a democrat nor an advocate of limited constitutional 
government. Bentham, in contrast, was an outspoken reformer who sought to make law 
accessible to all, grew increasingly sympathetic toward democratic ideas and the extension of 
the franchise, and developed a theory of constitutionalism that located sovereignty in the people. 
See, e.g., POSTEMA, supra note 3, at 260, 373–76, 448. Unlike Bentham, Austin grew deeply 
suspicious of “the people,” bemoaned their “prejudices” and “ignorance,” placed his faith in the 
educated and well-to-do classes, and fought against the extension of the franchise. See id. at 
327–28; AUSTIN, supra note 5, at 61–87; HAMBURGER & HAMBURGER, supra note 36, at 26–52; 
RUMBLE, supra note 3, at 197–205. His assumptions about the nature of science and his 
distinctive “personality” may have shaped Austin’s political attitudes. See generally W.L. 
MORISON, JOHN AUSTIN (1982) (presenting a comprehensive study of Austin). Similarly, 
Bentham and Austin differed in their views of non-positivist “law.” Bentham rejected the idea 
of “natural law” as a fiction that represented the mere expression of “private opinion in 
disguise,” quoted in POSTEMA, supra note 3, at 269, while Austin affirmed “without hesitation” 
the existence of “Divine laws” and declared that its obligations were “paramountto those 
imposed by any other laws,” AUSTIN, supra note 5, at 184. 
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The Langdellian strain became linked with ideas about property, liberty 
of contract, corporate enterprise, laissez-faire economics, and the 
essential role of the courts in protecting the established social and 
economic order.74 It became linked, in other words, with late nineteenth 
and early twentieth century political “conservatism” and subsequently 
with what more recent scholars termed “classical legal thought.”75 In 
contrast, the Holmesian strain became linked with ideas about social 
justice, communal welfare, governmental regulation, and the essential 
role of the legislature in ameliorating the harsh consequences of 
industrialization and urbanization. The Holmesian strain became linked, 
in other words, with campaigns for social reform and identified as the 
jurisprudence of Progressivism and then the New Deal.76  
Why, exactly, legal and political writers forged those dual 
jurisprudential and political linkages has been a subject of extended 
debate. Surely Langdell was no more a typical conservative than 
Holmes was a typical Progressive.77 Conservative judges, moreover, 
could prove as “instrumental” in their decision-making as progressive 
judges could prove “formalistic.”78 Subsequent decades, moreover, 
                                                                                                                     
 74. For example, “It may be that this positivism is largely due to the expansion of modern 
industry and commerce which has caused lawyers to be more concerned with the protection of 
private economic interests than with the larger issues of social well-being.” Cohen, supra note 
63, at 237. Similarly, sometimes scholars pictured “historical jurisprudence,” another prominent 
element in late nineteenth-century legal thought, as “conservative,” but it too could be used to 
support “both conservative and liberal positions.” RABBAN, supra note 27, at 71. 
 75. Roscoe Pound, Mechanical Jurisprudence, 8 COLUM. L. REV. 605 (1908); see, e.g., 
MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW 1870–1960: THE CRISIS OF 
LEGAL ORTHODOXY 9–32 (1992); Duncan Kennedy, Toward an Historical Understanding of 
Legal Consciousness: The Case of Classical Legal Thought in America, 1850–1940, 3 RES. L. & 
SOC. 3 (1980). See generally WIECEK, supra note 39 (discussing classical legal thought). 
 76. See, e.g., AMERICAN LEGAL REALISM (William W. Fisher III et al. eds., 1993) 
(collecting excerpts from primary Legal Realist sources); id. at xiii (noting that the Legal 
Realists were “steeped in the political tradition of Progressivism”); HORWITZ, supra note 75, at 
109–43. James Bradley Thayer attracted many Progressives with his positivist argument that 
courts should not invalidate legislative acts unless they clearly and unmistakably violated 
constitutional provisions. See James B. Thayer, The Origin and Scope of the American Doctrine 
of Constitutional Law, 7 HARV. L. REV. 129, 144 (1893) (argument); Wallace Mendelson, The 
Influence of James B. Thayer upon the Work of Holmes, Brandeis, and Frankfurter, 31 VAND. L. 
REV. 71 (1978) (discussing the attraction to Thayer’s argument by many Progressive Justices). 
 77. Langdell suggested government ownership as a useful way to resolve the problem of 
railroad regulation. KIMBALL, supra note 27, at 331–37. Moreover, he “had few qualms about 
legislative power”—the focus of progressive hopes—perhaps in part because of his sympathy 
for the Austinian concept of sovereignty. LAPIANA, supra note 27, at 124. For his part, “Holmes 
repeatedly professed skepticism about the efficacy of hours and wages legislation, child labor 
reform, and other policy goals of ‘progressives.’” G. EDWARD WHITE, JUSTICE OLIVER WENDELL 
HOLMES: LAW AND THE INNER SELF 320 (1993). 
 78. On some of the substantive values that underlay late nineteenth-century constitutional 
law, see HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ENTERPRISE AND AMERICAN LAW, 1836–1937, at 182 (1991), 
and Herbert Hovenkamp, The Political Economy of Substantive Due Process, 40 STAN. L. REV. 
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demonstrated that advocates of both political persuasions could readily 
use the assumptions and methods of either jurisprudential approach.79  
“Analytic jurisprudence” and political conservatism had, in fact, 
only a partial and sharply contested connection.  Seeking to protect 
private property and liberty of contract, defend common law rules that 
favored business, and strengthen the judiciary against the legislature, 
some conservatives did find the assumptions behind analytic 
jurisprudence congenial. Its emphasis on abstract principles, bright-line 
categories, and relatively abstract doctrinal reasoning could serve to 
underwrite faith in unchanging constitutional principles while insulating 
the courts from political criticism for the harsh practical consequences 
of some of their rulings.80 Not all analytic jurists, however, were 
conservatives. Langdell, for example, criticized the growth of corporate 
power and urged tighter regulation of business along with governmental 
ownership of railroads and other public utilities.81 More important, 
many and perhaps most political conservatives rejected analytic 
jurisprudence. They believed that its positivist foundation emphasizing 
“command” and “sanction” undermined the idea that law was based on 
fundamental principles of natural or divine law.  Even more, they feared 
that the positivist concept of “sovereignty” made governments—
especially those in the hands of popularly elected legislatures—the 
wielders of dangerous and potentially unlimited power that threatened 
liberty, property, and republican principles.82 Thus, the proclaimed 
                                                                                                                     
379 (1988). On the instrumentalist nature of the turn-of-the-century Court, see generally Edward 
A. Purcell, Jr., Some Horwitzian Themes in the Law and History of the Federal Courts, in 2 
TRANSFORMATIONS IN AMERICAN LEGAL HISTORY: LAW, IDEOLOGY, AND METHODS—ESSAYS IN 
HONOR OF MORTON J. HORWITZ 271 (Daniel W. Hamilton & Alfred L. Brophy eds., 2010); 
Edward A. Purcell, Jr., The Particularly Dubious Case of Hans v. Louisiana: An Essay on Law, 
Race, History, and “Federal Courts,” 81 N.C. L. REV. 1927, 1954–75 (2003). The 
“conservative” Chief Justice William Howard Taft could be coldly instrumental, and the 
“Progressive” Justice Louis D. Brandeis could be ruthlessly conceptualistic. On Taft’s 
instrumentalism, see EDWARD A. PURCELL, JR., LITIGATION AND INEQUALITY: FEDERAL 
DIVERSITY JURISDICTION IN INDUSTRIAL AMERICA, 1870–1958, at 109–12 (1992) [hereinafter 
PURCELL, LITIGATION AND INEQUALITY], and Robert C. Post, Chief Justice William Howard Taft 
and the Concept of Federalism, in FEDERALISM AND THE JUDICIAL MIND: ESSAYS ON AMERICAN 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW AND POLITICS 53–74 (Harry N. Scheiber ed., 1992). On Brandeis’s 
conceptualism, see ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE UNPUBLISHED OPINIONS OF MR. JUSTICE 
BRANDEIS: THE SUPREME COURT AT WORK 118 (1957), and PURCELL, supra note 24, at 155–64. 
 79. General jurisprudential theories are elastic and capable of serving many purposes. As 
Morton J. Horwitz commented, “Most of the basic concepts and definitions used by Bentham, 
Austin and their successors changed in meaning over time depending on the political 
commitments of their authors.” Horwitz, supra note 44, at 558. 
 80. See HORWITZ, supra note 75, at 9–31. 
 81. KIMBALL, supra note 27, at 331–37.  
 82. PARKER, supra note 70, at 237–44. See generally Lewis A. Grossman, James Coolidge 
Carter and Mugwump Jurisprudence, 20 LAW & HIST. REV. 577 (2002); Louise A. Halper, 
Christopher G. Tiedeman, ‘Laissez-Faire Constitutionalism’ and the Dilemmas of Small-Scale 
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linkage between analytic jurisprudence and political conservatism was 
far more imagined than real. 
In contrast, the linkage between sociological jurisprudence and 
political Progressivism was substantial and even inspirational. The 
Holmesian emphasis on the scope of judicial discretion, the role of 
policy considerations and personal values in judicial decision making, 
and the instrumental function of the law in serving society’s dominant 
forces combined to make his ideas welcome weapons for those who 
believed that the courts favored organized wealth and corporate power. 
Further, Holmes’ stress on the need for judicial deference to legislative 
judgments resonated deeply with the Progressives’ faith in the 
legislature and their call for sweeping social and economic reforms. 
Finally, Holmes’ emphasis on the role of social “experience” in shaping 
the “life” of the law pointed to the idea of a “living Constitution,” and 
suggested the need for scientific study of changing social conditions 
along with the possibility that such studies could enable people to use 
government intelligently to improve those conditions for everyone.83 
That linkage between “sociological jurisprudence” and political 
Progressivism was not only real, but it was also largely responsible for 
forging the derogatory counter image of “mechanical” and 
“conceptualistic” jurisprudence as well as for hanging that label on 
conservative judicial decisions and anti-Progressive courts. In  
advocating legislative reforms and attacking conservative judicial 
decisions, Progressives found powerful ideological leverage in 
characterizing their adversaries as out-of-touch “conceptualists” and 
abstract “formalists” who failed to understand the modern industrial 
world and the unprecedented social problems it created.84 Like the 
derogatory concept of an allegedly merciless and politically retrograde 
                                                                                                                     
Property in the Gilded Age, 51 OHIO ST. L.J. 1349 (1990); Alan Jones, Thomas M. Cooley and 
“Laissez-Faire Constitutionalism”: A Reconsideration, 53 J. AM. HIST. 751 (1967); LaPiana, 
supra note 22; Kunal M. Parker, Context in History and Law: A Study of the Late Nineteenth-
Century American Jurisprudence of Custom, 24 LAW & HIST. REV. 473 (2006); Siegel, 
Historism, supra note 22. 
 83. Holmes famously incorporated his idea of a living Constitution into his opinion in 
Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416 (1920). In 1938, Pound opined that “Austin now stands much 
better than he did fifty years ago” because his ideas were compatible with “régimes of social 
control” and a “rejection of the idea of restriction of state action to the minimum.” Pound, supra 
note 48, at 564. Austin’s reputation rose, Pound suggested, because his views were relatively 
compatible with the triumphant views of Progressivism and sociological jurisprudence. Id.  
 84. Morris Cohen, for example, used an infamous state judicial decision to illustrate the 
“tragic absurdity of a court’s failure to understand modern industrial conditions.” Cohen, supra 
note 46, at 354 n.4. Herbert Croly echoed the same theme: “The particular expression of the 
conservative spirit to which progressivism finds itself opposed is essentially, and, as it seems, 
necessarily doctrinaire and dogmatic.” HERBERT CROLY, PROGRESSIVE DEMOCRACY 20 (1914). 
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“social Darwinism,”85 the idea of a conservative “mechanical,” 
“formalist,” and “conceptualistic” jurisprudence was for the most part 
another polemical construct of Progressivism, not an accurate 
description of the thinking of either political conservatives or anti-
Progressive judges.86 
Beyond the level of politics and polemics, however, sociological 
jurists and political Progressives did advance constitutional arguments 
that were consistent with the theses of legal positivism. Although they 
did not take its name or use its vocabulary, their charges reflected its 
fundamental ideas. The “conservative” jurisprudence of the Supreme 
Court and much of the judiciary was biased and unsound, they argued, 
because it was suffused with illegitimate, extraconstitutional value 
judgments that distorted the Constitution’s true meaning.87 In effect, 
they made two parallel claims: first, that the anti-Progressive courts 
frequently violated three of positivism’s fundamental principles, the 
theses of “separation,” “sources,” and “traceability”; and second, that 
their own reformist jurisprudence would honor those principles by 
excluding extraconstitutional value judgments and enforcing only the 
clear commands of the Constitution and the positive enactments of the 
legislature. 
Not surprisingly, however, the Progressive embrace of positivism 
was also limited and carefully contoured. The idea of a “living” 
Constitution, after all, raised questions about the exact meaning of all 
three of those positivist theses—“separation,” “sources,” and 
                                                                                                                     
 85. While Darwinism was a major intellectual influence and large numbers of American 
scientists and intellectuals sought to apply evolutionary ideas to the study of human beings and 
their societies, the phrase “social Darwinism” became a political label used to discredit 
“conservatives” and their neoclassical economic ideas by equating them with a cruel and brutal 
philosophy of “survival of the fittest.” Few businessmen and political “conservatives” actually 
believed in, or invoked, such “Darwinian” ideas. See, e.g., ROBERT C. BANNISTER, SOCIAL 
DARWINISM: SCIENCE AND MYTH IN ANGLO-AMERICAN SOCIAL THOUGHT (1979); MIKE 
HAWKINS, SOCIAL DARWINISM IN EUROPEAN AND AMERICAN THOUGHT, 1860–1945: NATURE AS 
MODEL AND NATURE AS THREAT 7–8 (1997) (“social Darwinism” as pejorative); Edward A. 
Purcell, Jr., Ideas and Interests: Businessmen and the Interstate Commerce Act, 54 J. AM. HIST. 
561, 574–75 (1967); Irvin G. Wyllie, Social Darwinism and the Businessman, 103 PROC. AM. 
PHIL. SOC. 629 (1959). 
 86. On the complexities and policy concerns of late nineteenth-century conservative legal 
writers, see, for example, DAVID E. BERNSTEIN, REHABILITATING LOCHNER: DEFENDING 
INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS AGAINST PROGRESSIVE REFORM 1–22 (2011); MARK WARREN BAILEY, 
GUARDIANS OF THE MORAL ORDER: THE LEGAL PHILOSOPHY OF THE SUPREME COURT, 1860–1910 
(2004); PURCELL, LITIGATION AND INEQUALITY, supra note 78, at 395–396 nn.14–15; Halper, 
supra note 82; Hovenkamp, The Political Economy of Substantive Due Process, supra note 78; 
Jones, supra note 82; Charles W. McCurdy, Justice Field and the Jurisprudence of Government-
Business Relations: Some Parameters of Laissez-Faire Constitutionalism, 1863–1897, 61 J. AM. 
HIST. 970 (1975); Siegel, Historism, supra note 22.  
 87. See, e.g., BAILEY, supra note 86; PURCELL, LITIGATION AND INEQUALITY, supra note 
78, at 262–91; Hovenkamp, supra note 78; McCurdy, supra note 86. 
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“traceability.” Insofar as Progressives believed in a “living” 
Constitution, they believed that it reflected their own adaptive 
interpretations of such key constitutional concepts as “liberty” and 
“justice.” Implicitly, they remolded those positivist theses and 
reinterpreted them to serve their ideas of social evolution and their goals 
for wide-ranging reform. 
Thus, by the early decades of the twentieth century Austinian 
positivism had threaded itself into the complex tapestry of American 
legal thought, contributed to a range of diverse jurisprudential theories, 
and developed real and alleged linkages with opposing political and 
constitutional ideologies. As a distinct jurisprudential approach 
identified by its own name, however, it had essentially disappeared. 
When Pound discussed the history of American legal thought in 1938, 
he dismissed “positivism”—apparently thinking of it only in its 
Comtean sense—as insignificant. “Only a few words need be said about 
positivism,” he wrote. “It had little or no effect on judicial decision,” 
and for the most part merely “confirmed the ideas of the historical 
jurists.”88 Revealingly, he saw its only import as negative. “So far as it 
had influence,” he commented, “it furthered the characteristic juristic 
pessimism of the end of the last century.”89  
C.  Transformations in a New Age of International Crises: Nazism, 
World War II, and the Cold War 
While Pound’s dismissive judgment about the significance of a 
distinctly “positivist” jurisprudence likely reflected a common attitude 
into the late 1930s, that view changed drastically in a remarkably short 
span of years. The events of the late 1930s and early 1940s—the rise of 
Nazism, the onset of a new world war, and the shattering events that 
followed—profoundly altered the nation’s concerns and assumptions.90 
Casting both scientific advances and naturalist ideas in a newly ominous 
light, those events transformed the relationship of legal positivist ideas 
to both democratic theory and constitutional law. 
During the early years of the twentieth century, naturalist and 
relativist assumptions had become tightly interwoven with democratic 
ideas and constitutional values. From Holmes’ skeptical deference to 
the legislature91 and Pound’s expertise-oriented reform proposals92 to 
                                                                                                                     
 88. POUND, supra note 63, at 116. 
 89. Id.; accord Cohen, supra note 63; Pound, supra note 48, at 558, 562. 
 90. See generally BENJAMIN L. ALPERS, DICTATORS, DEMOCRACY, AND AMERICAN PUBLIC 
CULTURE: ENVISIONING THE TOTALITARIAN ENEMY, 1920S–1950S (2003). 
 91. “I am so skeptical as to our knowledge about the goodness or badness of laws that I 
have no practical criterion except what the crowd wants.” Letter from Oliver Wendell Holmes, 
Jr. to Frederick Pollock (Apr. 23, 1910), in 1 HOLMES-POLLOCK LETTERS: THE 
23
Purcell: Democracy, the Constitution, and Legal Positivism in America: Les
Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2015
1480 FLORIDA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 66 
 
the romantic egalitarianism of John Dewey93 and the social 
investigations of Jane Addams’s Hull-House,94 pragmatic ideas and 
faith in scientific methods had spread widely, and American 
intellectuals commonly saw them as rational supports for both 
democratic values and an intelligent constitutionalism. “The perfect 
type of authoritative technical methods are those which prevail among 
scientific men in respect to scientific work,” Herbert Croly had 
declared.95 Turned toward the goal of “social improvement,” those 
methods were “doing more to revolutionize and reconstruct the 
American democracy than can a regiment of professional revolutionists 
and reformers.”96  
As Americans confronted the unnerving threat of Nazism and the 
massive challenges of war and cold war, however, many came to see 
naturalist and empiricist philosophies as barren and inadequate, while 
scientific achievements appeared newly unnerving and—with the 
disclosure of Nazi death camps and the arrival of the atomic bomb—
newly terrifying. Political, religious, and philosophical critics of 
sociological and realist jurisprudence, and often of the Progressive and 
New Deal policies they commonly supported, grew in numbers and 
fervor. Critics began to charge that naturalist ideas led to intellectual 
relativism and moral nihilism and that they consequently undermined 
democratic ideals by denying any rational moral basis for either 
condemning Nazism or justifying democracy. Indeed, such critics 
insisted, those who adopted Holmesian attitudes could not rationally 
distinguish the most evil Nazi edicts from what was properly and truly 
“law.” Rather than being allies of democracy, then, Holmesian and 
realist ideas were its lethal enemies.97  
It was at this juncture that critics of legal realism revived the term 
“positivism.” They did so to merge the variety of naturalist and 
empiricist ideas that inspired sociological and realist approaches with 
the highly negative idea of an amoral and anti-religious “philosophical 
                                                                                                                     
CORRESPONDENCE OF MR. JUSTICE HOLMES AND SIR FREDERICK POLLOCK, 1874–1932, at 163, 
163 (Mark DeWolfe Howe ed., 1942). 
 92. DAVID WIGDOR, ROSCOE POUND: PHILOSOPHER OF LAW 198–200 (1974). 
 93. See, e.g., ALAN RYAN, JOHN DEWEY AND THE HIGH TIDE OF AMERICAN LIBERALISM 
86–88 (1995). 
 94. “We continually conduct small but careful investigations at Hull-House . . . .” JANE 
ADDAMS, TWENTY YEARS AT HULL–HOUSE WITH AUTOBIOGRAPHICAL NOTES 301 (1943). 
 95. HERBERT CROLY, THE PROMISE OF AMERICAN LIFE 434 (1909). 
 96. Id. at 439. Progressive reform “implies the selection of peculiarly competent, 
energetic, and responsible individuals to perform the peculiarly difficult and exacting parts in a 
socially constructive drama.” Id. at 428. “The more clear-sighted progressives almost 
unanimously believe in a body of expert administrative officials . . . .” CROLY, supra note 84, at 
355–56.  
 97. See generally EDWARD A. PURCELL, JR., THE CRISIS OF DEMOCRATIC THEORY: 
SCIENTIFIC NATURALISM AND THE PROBLEM OF VALUE 159–78 (1973). 
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positivism” that most nineteenth-century Americans had rejected. As a 
general philosophy, the critics maintained, positivism was materialist, 
determinist, relativist, and irreligious, and as a political philosophy it 
was now proving itself nihilistic, antidemocratic, and ultimately 
totalitarian. Lon L. Fuller’s 1940 book, The Law in Quest of Itself, was 
pivotal in shifting legal attitudes because it assaulted legal realism and 
modern intellectual developments by merging them as examples of a 
pervasive and debilitating “positivism.” Fuller focused in particular on 
the “separation thesis” and “the inability of positivism, in all its forms, 
to deal with the content of the law.”98 Positivism, he charged, entailed 
moral skepticism and nihilism, and it gave birth to a morally unmoored 
and “peculiarly modern conception of democracy” that would prove 
“suicidal” to western democracies.99 That skeptical and nihilistic 
conception “accelerated the disintegrative forces which threaten modern 
society” and was “demonstrably incapable of sustaining a nation in time 
of crisis.”100 He left no doubt about his point. “This negative conception 
of democracy played an important part, I am convinced, in bringing 
Germany and Spain to the disasters which engulfed those countries.”101  
In the frightening context of the 1940s, Fuller’s charges drew blood. 
The decade witnessed the disintegration of legal realism as a 
                                                                                                                     
 98. LON L. FULLER, THE LAW IN QUEST OF ITSELF 88 (1940) (emphasis in original). The 
“common objective of all systems of positivism is to preserve a distinction between the law that 
is and the law that should be or is trying to be.” Id. at 132. Fuller’s use of the term “positivism” 
may also have been encouraged by the arrival in the United States in the 1930s of a school of 
philosophy known as “logical positivism,” which taught that metaphysics was meaningless, that 
intelligible statements were limited to assertions about observable phenomena, and that moral 
propositions represented nothing but declarations of personal preferences and emotions. See 
R.W. Ashby, Logical Positivism, in A CRITICAL HISTORY OF WESTERN PHILOSOPHY 492 (D.J. 
O’Connor ed., 1964).  
 99. FULLER, supra note 98, at 120–21. 
 100. Id. at 125. Similarly, Morris R. Cohen became more critical of realist ideas in the 
1930s. Compare Cohen, supra note 63, at 239 (1927) (“Yet positivism or respect for positive 
law cannot be eliminated.”), with Cohen, supra note 46, at 357, 360, 365 (1931) (warning 
against the danger of legal realism as similar to behaviorism and criticizing positivism for 
“view[ing] the law exclusively as uniformities of existing behavior, in total disregard of any 
ideals as to what it should be”).  
 101. FULLER, supra note 98, at 122. Friedrich A. Hayek advanced similar arguments in his 
1944 book, The Road to Serfdom, and linked Nazism and totalitarianism explicitly to “legal 
positivism” in FRIEDRICH A. HAYEK, THE CONSTITUTION OF LIBERTY 155–56, 236–39 (1960) 
[hereinafter HAYEK, THE CONSTITUTION OF LIBERTY]. In the latter work, Hayek quoted the Swiss 
neo-orthodox theologian Emil Brunner, who declared that “[t]he totalitarian state is simply and 
solely legal positivism in political practice.” EMIL BRUNNER, JUSTICE AND THE SOCIAL ORDER 7 
(Mary Hottinger trans., 2d ed. 1945), quoted in HAYEK, THE CONSTITUTION OF LIBERTY, supra, 
at 499 n.83. The political scientist John Hallowell used the term for similar purposes in 1944, 
charging that positivism led to “nihilism in thought and anarchy in practice.” GEORGE H. NASH, 
THE CONSERVATIVE INTELLECTUAL MOVEMENT IN AMERICA: SINCE 1945, at 44–45 (1976) 
(internal quotation marks omitted).  
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recognizable movement, a renewed interest in theories of natural law, 
and a “religious revival” that gave new impetus to the idea that religion 
was the foundation of democracy.102 Further, the horrors of Nazism 
generated a powerful drive to bring its perpetrators to justice, a goal that 
seemed unjustifiable under positivist principles.103 Thus, the Nuremberg 
and Tokyo war crimes trials rejected the positivist ideas that law and 
morals were separate and that only the “command” of the sovereign was 
truly “law.” In their place grew revitalized ideas of “higher” laws, 
newly established institutions of international law, and spreading 
appeals to universal “human rights.”104  
The crises of the 1940s generated a vibrant national consensus that 
proclaimed the moral superiority of democracy and the need for “faith” 
in its moral goodness and ultimate triumph, while the subsequent Cold 
War strengthened and sustained that cultural formation.105 Throughout 
the remainder of his long career, Fuller, for one, continued to warn 
against the fatal dangers of positivism. When H. L. A. Hart, the 
Professor of Jurisprudence at Oxford University and the foremost 
postwar advocate of legal positivism, taught at Harvard in 1957–58, he 
was acutely aware that Fuller thought him “a radically mistaken 
positivist.”106 More important, Hart recalled, “[t]he word positivist had 
a tremendously evil ring.”107  
While critics condemned positivist ideas in the name of democracy, 
                                                                                                                     
 102. NASH, supra note 101, at 57–83. See generally RICHARD H. PELLS, THE LIBERAL MIND 
IN A CONSERVATIVE AGE: AMERICAN INTELLECTUALS IN THE 1940S AND 1950S (1985); PURCELL, 
supra note 97, at 235–66.  
 103. Compare, e.g., H.L.A. Hart, Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals, 71 
HARV. L. REV. 593, 618–20 (1958) (criticizing the German postwar courts for allowing a 
criminal conviction where the act in question was legal at the time), with Lon L. Fuller, 
Positivism and Fidelity to Law—A Reply to Professor Hart, 71 HARV. L. REV. 630, 648–57 
(1958) (defending the German courts). 
 104. RUTI G. TEITEL, TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE 29–33 (2000); see, e.g., DAVID KENNEDY, THE 
DARK SIDES OF VIRTUE: REASSESSING INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIANISM (2004) (presenting an 
account of the often unspoken “dark side” of humanitarianism); GEOFFREY BEST, WAR AND LAW 
SINCE 1945 (1994). See generally TELFORD TAYLOR, THE ANATOMY OF THE NUREMBERG TRIALS: 
A PERSONAL MEMOIR (1992) (presenting a personal account of the Nuremberg trials). 
 105. See, e.g., ROBERT WUTHNOW, THE RESTRUCTURING OF AMERICAN RELIGION: SOCIETY 
AND FAITH SINCE WORLD WAR II (1988); PURCELL, supra note 97, at 235–72; JOHN F. WILSON, 
PUBLIC RELIGION IN AMERICAN CULTURE (1979). For the classic work that argues the political 
compatibility of the major American religions with democracy, see WILL HERBERG, 
PROTESTANT-CATHOLIC-JEW: AN ESSAY IN AMERICAN RELIGIOUS SOCIOLOGY (rev. ed. 1960). 
 106. NICOLA LACEY, A LIFE OF H. L. A. HART: THE NIGHTMARE AND THE NOBLE DREAM 
181 (2004). 
 107. Id. Hart also remembered Fuller’s academic and philosophical ally, Henry M. Hart, 
Jr., for “castigating” him over “his mistaken positivist views.” Id. at 187 (quoting Lacey’s text, 
not H.L.A. Hart himself). See generally Charles L. Barzun, The Forgotten Foundations of Hart 
and Sacks, 99 VA. L. REV. 1 (2013) (discussing the origins of Henry M. Hart, Jr.’s critique of 
positivism). 
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however, others honored positivist ideas in the name of 
constitutionalism. During the late nineteenth and early twentieth 
centuries sociological jurists and political Progressives had used 
positivist ideas to attack both Langdellian “formalism” and the 
“conservative” Court, and in the years after 1937 those ideas came to 
the supreme bench. President Franklin Roosevelt’s new appointees 
shared the views of the sociological and Progressive critics of the old 
Court, and they heralded an era of “judicial restraint” and broad 
deference to legislative directives.108  
The subsequent jurisprudence of the New Deal Court reflected the 
legal positivist ideas inherent in the Progressive critique of the old 
Court. The Roosevelt Justices hailed the legislature as the fundamental 
lawmaking body in a democracy and insisted that judges should 
interpret statutes to achieve the legislature’s purpose and refrain from 
reading their own personal and extraconstitutional values into the law. 
Courts should invalidate the actions of other governmental branches, 
they maintained, only when those actions clearly and unquestionably 
transgressed the commands of the Constitution. The Roosevelt Justices, 
in other words, upheld positions generally consistent with positivism’s 
“sources,” “traceability,” and “separation” theses.  
Thus, the years that surrounded World War II and the Cold War 
brought fundamental, if radically bifurcated, changes in American 
attitudes toward the ideas of legal positivism. With respect to 
democratic theory, positivism and the naturalist ideas associated with 
sociological jurisprudence and political Progressivism came to be seen 
as dangerous and destructive. With its “separation” thesis spotlighted as 
amoral and nihilistic, legal positivism stood as democracy’s deadly 
enemy. In contrast, with respect to constitutional law, those same 
positivist ideas appeared authentically democratic. They underwrote a 
jurisprudence that constrained “unelected” judges, prohibited them from 
infusing their own personal moral values into their legal decisions, and 
directed them to follow only the authoritative commands of the 
Constitution and the legislature. Progressivism had made positivist ideas 
a bulwark of both constitutionalism and democracy, but Nazism and the 
age of war and Cold War fractured that union and made some positivist 
ideas the foundation of constitutionalism but cast others as the 
destroyers of democracy.  
D.  Legal Positivism in Contemporary America 
During the last half century, debate about the meaning and 
                                                                                                                     
 108. See generally BARRY CUSHMAN, RETHINKING THE NEW DEAL COURT: THE STRUCTURE 
OF A CONSTITUTIONAL REVOLUTION (1998); C. HERMAN PRITCHETT, THE ROOSEVELT COURT: A 
STUDY IN JUDICIAL POLITICS AND VALUES 1937–1947 (1948) (discussing the politics and values 
of President Roosevelt’s appointees as discerned from split opinions of the Supreme Court). 
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significance of “positivism” underwent further shifts and 
realignments.109 The debate over positivism’s significance for 
democracy waned as the tensions of war and Cold War relaxed and then 
faded. In contrast, the debate over positivism’s constitutional salience 
waxed as the Warren Court replaced the New Deal Court and provoked 
an intense political and jurisprudential reaction that transformed 
positivist ideas once again, this time switching them from weapons of 
post-New Deal liberalism into weapons of post-sixties conservatism. 
In discussions of democracy, the postwar debate over positivism 
cooled as world conditions and foreign policy challenges changed 
drastically.110 The softening and eventual end of the Cold War and the 
concurrent emergence of a new “globalizing” world brought 
bewildering new complications, while recurring experiences of regime 
change raised agonizing problems of “transitional justice” that 
highlighted enduring tensions between positive law and morality.111 
Positivist appeals to newly institutionalized practices of international 
law confronted nonpositivist appeals to norms of universal “human 
rights.” Peoples and nations hailed democracy across the world, but 
they also widely and often bitterly contested its meaning and 
implications. The old and rigid Cold War debate over the consequences 
of positivism and antipositivism for democracy seemed simplistic and 
outmoded.  
Beyond those broad historical shifts, positivism’s relevance for 
                                                                                                                     
 109. Even when memories of Nazism and the war faded, critics continued periodically to 
attack the debilitating character of positivism and relativism. “Holmes was at the forefront of a 
revolution whose achievements were mostly negative. This revolution was not a ‘revolt against 
formalism’ but a revolt against objective concepts of right and wrong—a revolt against natural 
law.” ALBERT W. ALSCHULER, LAW WITHOUT VALUES: THE LIFE, WORK, AND LEGACY OF 
JUSTICE HOLMES 10 (2000) (endnote omitted). 
 110. The term “positivism” continued in use in the social sciences, perhaps most 
commonly in the field of economics. “Positive economics is in principle independent of any 
particular ethical position or normative judgments,” Milton Friedman wrote in 1953. “As 
Keynes says, it deals with ‘what is,’ not with ‘what ought to be.’” MILTON FRIEDMAN, ESSAYS IN 
POSITIVE ECONOMICS 4 (1953). The positivist label again became a term of scorn in the 1960s 
and 1970s as part of the Left’s critique of science, expertise, and objectivism. “One common 
element” of the period’s intellectual and social critique was “its attack on positivism, and more 
generally its attack on the claims of objectivity . . . .” Edward L. Rubin, The Practice and 
Discourse of Legal Scholarship, 86 MICH. L. REV. 1835, 1839 (1988); see also Edward A. 
Purcell, Jr., Social Thought, 35 AM. Q. 80, 83–90 (1983) (relating the period’s attack on 
objectivism). During the last quarter of the twentieth century the term returned to use in a 
favorable light in connection with the development of “positive political theory,” a movement 
that sought to use game theory, statistical methods, and social choice analysis to explain the 
logic of individual and institutional political behavior. See, e.g., WILLIAM H. RIKER & PETER C. 
ORDESHOOK, AN INTRODUCTION TO POSITIVE POLITICAL THEORY (1973); 1–2 DAVID AUSTEN-
SMITH & JEFFREY S. BANKS, POSITIVE POLITICAL THEORY (1999, 2006). 
 111. See, e.g., RUTI TEITEL, HUMANITY’S LAW (2011) (discussing these recently emergent 
issues); TEITEL, supra note 104. 
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debates over democracy also declined in importance because the 
academic field of legal theory itself changed internally. While an 
ongoing debate between Fuller and Hart kept the Nazi-era experience 
alive through the 1950s, their exchanges gradually muted the apparent 
salience of their disagreement. The two paramount postwar 
representatives of natural law and legal positivism showed themselves 
in general agreement on most specific political and moral issues, and 
their theoretical differences came to seem ever more slender and 
arcane.112  
Moreover, the publication in 1961 of Hart’s magnum opus, The 
Concept of Law,113 which stimulated positivist thinking among 
academic specialists, turned the field of legal philosophy away from 
popular and public political disputes. The book shifted the discipline’s 
focus to the conceptual analysis of “legal systems” as they existed “in 
general,” and it altered the field’s method from relatively common-
sense legal and political reasoning to the technical tools of modern 
British language philosophy. The book eclipsed practical and empirical 
concerns and made legal positivism more generalized, more analytically 
rigorous, and more tightly focused on the internal “rules” necessary to 
create a “general” legal system.114 As positivist legal philosophy grew 
more technical and abstract, it gained conceptual precision but lost 
popular and political relevance.115  
Indeed, by the late twentieth century legal positivism bore only a 
tenuous relationship to its classical nineteenth-century form. Hart 
                                                                                                                     
 112. Both Hart and Fuller agreed, for example, that an overtly retrospective statute would 
have best dealt with the problem of transitional justice after the fall of Nazism. See Fuller, supra 
note 103, at 661; Hart, supra, note 103, at 619–20. Needless to say, both favored democracy, 
condemned “totalitarianism,” and readily affirmed that Nazism established an evil and immoral 
regime whose “laws” did not deserve allegiance. Indeed, Fuller’s theoretical position was based 
in large part on philosophical pragmatism. Kenneth I. Winston, Is/Ought Redux: The Pragmatist 
Context of Lon Fuller’s Conception of Law, 8 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 329 (1988). 
 113. HART, supra note 3. 
 114. Most of those working in the positivist tradition abandoned Austin’s ideas about 
“sovereignty” and “command” in favor of more complex theories based on social rules and 
formal institutional procedures. See, e.g., Andrei Marmor, Legal Positivism: Still Descriptive 
and Morally Neutral, 26 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 683, 686 (2006). On Hart’s impact on modern 
positivism, see THE AUTONOMY OF LAW: ESSAYS ON LEGAL POSITIVISM (Robert P. George ed., 
1996); HART’S POSTSCRIPT: ESSAYS ON THE POSTSCRIPT TO THE CONCEPT OF LAW (Jules Coleman 
ed., 2001); LACEY, supra note 106; Leslie Green, The Concept of Law Revisited, 94 MICH. L. 
REV. 1687, 1711–17 (1996) (reviewing H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW (2d ed. 1994)); 
Frederick Schauer, Re(taking) Hart, 119 HARV. L. REV. 852, 866–67 (2006) (reviewing LACEY, 
supra note 106).  
 115. See Schauer, supra note 114. Hart’s “philosophical predilections proceeded to 
transform the field of jurisprudence,” id. at 862, but the “antiempirical purity” of his approach 
imposed a “distinct cost” of narrowness and abstractness on his “legacy,” id. at 868. See also 
William Twining, Academic Law and Legal Philosophy: The Significance of Herbert Hart, 95 
LAW Q. REV. 557, 561–62 (1979). 
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himself noted the many “ambiguities” and disagreements that existed 
among those who pursued positivist approaches,116 while another 
scholar concluded that the term “positivism” was used to describe 
twelve different and sometimes contradictory positions.117 Most 
striking, modern adherents divided sharply over one of positivism’s 
foundation principles, the “separation” thesis. Some, including Hart, 
advocated a “soft,” “inclusivist,” or “incorporationist” positivism that 
recognized that moral principles and values—as “social” products, not 
as elements of a “higher” natural or divine law—could be authoritative 
“sources” of law.118 Others held to a “hard” or “exclusivist” positivism 
that insisted that moral values and principles should be kept wholly 
separate from the positive and authoritative sources of law “properly so 
called.”119  
Finally, when Ronald Dworkin, who became the leading legal 
philosopher of American liberalism in the 1970s, extended Fuller’s 
critique of Hart’s work and launched repeated broadsides against its 
theoretical adequacy and political relevance, legal positivism was once 
again forced onto the defensive. Dworkin boldly carried the banner of 
post-New Deal liberalism, the civil rights movement, and the Warren 
Court, and he identified all three with individual rights, democratic 
values, and foundations in moral philosophy.120 In a series of works he 
sought to justify his interrelated claims on the basis of a philosophical 
examination of the nature of law and its relationship to rationally 
knowable moral principles.121 In the process Dworkin rejected or 
                                                                                                                     
 116. HART, supra note 3, at 302. 
 117. Robert S. Summers, Legal Philosophy Today—An Introduction, in ESSAYS IN LEGAL 
PHILOSOPHY 1, 15 (Robert S. Summers ed., 1968). 
 118. See HART, supra note 3, at 250–54. For thoughtful and diverse efforts to define 
positivism in more careful and nuanced terms, see JULES L. COLEMAN, MARKETS, MORALS AND 
THE LAW 3–27 (1988); BRIAN LEITER, NATURALIZING JURISPRUDENCE: ESSAYS ON AMERICAN 
LEGAL REALISM AND NATURALISM IN LEGAL PHILOSOPHY (2007); JEREMY WALDRON, LAW AND 
DISAGREEMENT 165–70 (1999).  
 119. See, e.g., Scott J. Shapiro, On Hart’s Way Out, 4 LEGAL THEORY 469, 475–76 (1998); 
Joseph Raz, Authority, Law and Morality, 68 MONIST 295, 311–15 (1985); cf. Marmor, supra 
note 114. 
 120. While Dworkin focused on legal issues, see, e.g., sources cited infra note 121, John 
Rawls advanced similar “liberal” ideas on a more abstract level in his construction of an 
elaborate egalitarian political philosophy, JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (1971).  
 121. For example, Dworkin wrote, “the American ideal of government not only under law 
but under principle as well is the most important contribution our history has given to political 
theory.” RONALD DWORKIN, FREEDOM’S LAW: THE MORAL READING OF THE AMERICAN 
CONSTITUTION 6 (1996). Under the “moral reading,” the Constitution’s provisions “refer to 
abstract moral principles and incorporate these by reference, as limits on government’s power.” 
Id. at 7; accord RONALD DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE 33–43 (1986); RONALD DWORKIN, A MATTER 
OF PRINCIPLE 131–37, 365–72 (1985) [hereinafter DWORKIN, A MATTER OF PRINCIPLE]; see also 
RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 14–80 (1978) [hereinafter DWORKIN, TAKING 
RIGHTS SERIOUSLY] (criticizing legal positivism). 
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severely criticized all four of legal positivism’s classic theses,122 and, in 
the process, spurred new and intriguing debates among academic 
specialists but further removed the discussion from popular political 
discourse.123 
As positivism’s role in discussions of democracy faded, its role in 
debates over constitutional interpretation flourished. There, however, 
political shifts reversed its practical and ideological utility. Although the 
Justices who dominated the New Deal Court tended to reflect the 
judicially restrictive views of Progressive legal positivism, the new 
liberal Justices of the Warren Court broke away from that mindset and 
abandoned its restrictive view of the judicial power. In the context of 
the Civil Rights Movement and an inspiring new social activism, they 
reoriented the Court’s jurisprudence once more. The Justices of the 
Warren Court replaced the “judicial restraint” of the New Deal Court 
with a new determination to enforce “fundamental” rights, and they saw 
the Constitution as a nationalist and egalitarian charter designed to 
protect an expansive range of rights that all Americans properly 
enjoyed.124 They drastically broadened the constitutional mandate of 
equal protection, pressed the nation toward elimination of racial 
discrimination, and recognized a variety of substantive rights involving 
speech, voting, privacy, marriage, religion, and criminal procedure—
rights sometimes drawn from the Constitution’s textual provisions only 
by strained implication. Along with Dworkin, many of the Court’s 
supporters sought to articulate normative theories to justify its liberal 
rulings, and they often appealed to relatively amorphous and sometimes 
abstract concepts such as “human” or “fundamental” rights and 
generalized principles of equality and democracy.125  
As the Warren Court helped define and implement a new liberal 
nationalist jurisprudence, those who either questioned or rejected its 
reasoning and methods began to draw more heavily on positivist ideas. 
Understandably, critics—some of whom were liberals sympathetic with 
                                                                                                                     
 122. Although Dworkin seemed to modify some of his views over the decades, as a general 
matter he rejected the “social” thesis, at least severely qualified the “separation” thesis (rejecting 
its classic or “hard” positivist sense and at least substantially altering its “soft” positivist sense), 
and reinterpreted the “sources” and “traceability” theses by infusing both with the principles of 
moral philosophy. For a critique of Dworkin’s analysis of positivism, see Brian Leiter, The End 
of Empire: Dworkin and Jurisprudence in the 21st Century, 36 RUTGERS L.J. 165 (2004). 
 123. See, e.g., Leslie Green, Positivism and the Inseparability of Law and Morals, 83 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1035 (2008); Frederick Schauer, Positivism Before Hart, 24 CAN. J.L. & 
JURISPRUDENCE 455 (2011). 
 124. See generally MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE WARREN COURT AND THE PURSUIT OF JUSTICE 
(1998); LUCAS A. POWE, JR., THE WARREN COURT AND AMERICAN POLITICS (2000).  
 125. Such a “social philosophy,” Hart wrote, “has much affinity with the eighteenth-
century doctrines of the unalienable rights of man which were for long thought to have 
succumbed to their great utilitarian critic[, Bentham].” HART, supra note 71, at 148.  
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much of the Court’s jurisprudence—focused on the gaps between the 
Court’s decisions and the Constitution’s provisions, and they pointed 
out that the rights the Court created and the values it invoked were 
sometimes found not in the Constitution but in the Justices’ personal 
values.126 In the 1970s and early 1980s the debate over positivistic ideas 
took on a sharper urgency, recharacterized for a time in newly adopted 
terms as “a debate between the ‘interpretivists,’ who believe that the 
Court must confine itself to norms clearly stated or implied in the 
language of the Constitution, and the ‘noninterpretivists,’ who believe 
that the Court may protect norms not mentioned in the Constitution’s 
text or in its preratification history.”127  
While “liberals” debated the quality of the Warren Court’s work and 
the arguments of Dworkin and other “rights” theorists, conservatives 
reacted more sharply, attacking the Court roundly and turning fully and 
far more insistently to positivist principles.128 The Constitution, they 
increasingly argued, had a determinate “original” meaning found in its 
text and in the original “intent” or “understanding” of those who drafted 
and ratified it.129 They argued that judges must follow that “original” 
                                                                                                                     
 126. For critiques of the Warren Court, see RAOUL BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY: 
THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT (1977); ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE 
SUPREME COURT AND THE IDEA OF PROGRESS (1978); PHILIP B. KURLAND, POLITICS, THE 
CONSTITUTION, AND THE WARREN COURT (1970); GERALD N. ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOW HOPE: 
CAN COURTS BRING ABOUT SOCIAL CHANGE? (2d ed. 1991); Henry M. Hart, Jr., Foreword: The 
Time Chart of the Justices, 73 HARV. L. REV. 84 (1959); Edwin Meese III, Construing the 
Constitution, Address Before the D.C. Chapter of the Federalist Society Lawyers Division (Nov. 
15, 1985), in 19 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 22 (1985). 
 127. Erwin Chemerinsky, The Price of Asking the Wrong Question: An Essay on 
Constitutional Scholarship and Judicial Review, 62 TEX. L. REV. 1207, 1208–09 (1984); see 
also, e.g., JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW (1980) 
(discussing the two theories while proposing a third theory); Thomas C. Grey, Do We Have an 
Unwritten Constitution?, 27 STAN. L. REV. 703 (1975). 
 128. “The first causes of the conservative countermobilization were changes in 
constitutional law in civil rights, criminal procedure, and sexual and religious 
freedom. . . . Richard Nixon ran for president in 1968 promising to brake the Warren Court’s 
activism . . . .” STEVEN M. TELES, THE RISE OF THE CONSERVATIVE LEGAL MOVEMENT: THE 
BATTLE FOR CONTROL OF THE LAW 60 (2008). For more on Nixon’s battle against the Warren 
Court, see JAMES F. SIMON, IN HIS OWN IMAGE: THE SUPREME COURT IN RICHARD NIXON’S 
AMERICA (1973). The correlation between the political right and philosophical positivism was 
imperfect, but it increased sharply over time. In 1968, for example, as he charged that the 
Warren Court “was voting its preferences into law,” Robert H. Bork suggested that the Court 
could resolve the interpretative problems it faced “by giving content to the concept of natural 
rights.” Robert H. Bork, The Supreme Court Needs a New Philosophy, FORTUNE, Dec. 1968, at 
138, 168. Bork subsequently repudiated parts of this article as his views changed and he moved 
toward positivist principles. See Robert H. Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment 
Problems, 47 IND. L.J. 1, 8 (1971) [hereinafter Bork, Neutral Principles]. 
 129. Robert H. Bork, The Constitution, Original Intent, and Economic Rights, 23 SAN 
DIEGO L. REV. 823, 823–24 (1986); William H. Rehnquist, The Notion of a Living Constitution, 
54 TEX. L. REV. 693, 705 (1976); see ORIGINALISM: A QUARTER-CENTURY OF DEBATE 1–109 
32
Florida Law Review, Vol. 66, Iss. 4 [2015], Art. 1
http://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol66/iss4/1
2014] LESSONS FROM A WINDING AND TROUBLED HISTORY 1489 
 
meaning and were prohibited from interpreting it in light of either their 
own personal values or the changing values of contemporary society.130 
The Warren Court violated those principles, they charged, and its 
jurisprudence was wrongheaded and illegitimate. 
Edwin Meese III, President Ronald Reagan’s attorney general in the 
1980s, announced the official conservative embrace of positivistic 
originalism. Denouncing the “radical egalitarianism and expansive civil 
libertarianism of the Warren Court,” he maintained that its 
jurisprudence was “ad hoc,” “bizarre,” and “more policy choices than 
articulation of constitutional principle.”131 The solution, he declared, 
was to return to the “original” intentions of the founders as “the only 
reliable guide for judgment.”132 Such an approach would “produce 
defensible principles of government that would not be tainted by 
ideological predilection.”133 For those reasons, he announced, it “has 
been and will continue to be the policy of this administration to press 
for a Jurisprudence of Original Intention.”134 
Thus, as many liberals moved away from legal positivism in defense 
of constitutionally unspecified rights and often in support of a “living” 
constitutionalism, conservatives turned to positivistic ideas in the form 
of constitutional “originalism” to discredit both. “I wish to 
demonstrate,” Robert Bork proclaimed, “that original intent is the only 
legitimate basis for constitutional decisionmaking.”135 His political 
objection was apparent. “For the past half-century, whenever the Court 
                                                                                                                     
(Steven G. Calabresi ed., 2007). “[T]he appeal of originalism was confined almost exclusively 
to those who opposed the activism of the Warren Court and sought to de-legitimate the Court’s 
claimed powers.” Morton J. Horwitz, Foreword: The Constitution of Change: Legal 
Fundamentality Without Fundamentalism, 107 HARV. L. REV. 30, 67 (1993).  
 130. Invocation of the original intent or understanding of the Founders is a standard 
method of constitutional argumentation, variously invoked by Justices and commentators in 
support of all political positions. See generally JOHNATHAN O’NEILL, ORIGINALISM IN AMERICAN 
LAW AND POLITICS: A CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY (2005). What was new about the debate 
beginning in the late twentieth century was the fact that conservative politicians, commentators, 
and judges seemed to advance “originalism” collectively as a formal—and often allegedly 
exclusive—theory of constitutional interpretation while shaping it into a rhetorical weapon 
directed specifically against “liberal” policies and many of the Warren Court’s decisions. In 
doing so, they often employed historical sources dubiously and selectively in an effort to create 
support for their contemporary ideological preferences. See, e.g., MARK TUSHNET, IN THE 
BALANCE: LAW AND POLITICS ON THE ROBERTS COURT 148–86, 247–80 (2013); Edward A. 
Purcell, Jr., From the Particular to the General: Three Federal Rules and the Jurisprudence of 
the Rehnquist and Roberts Courts, 162 U. PA. L. REV. 1731 (2014). 
 131. Edwin Meese III, Att’y Gen., Speech Before the American Bar Association (July 9, 
1985), in THE FEDERALIST SOCIETY, THE GREAT DEBATE: INTERPRETING OUR WRITTEN 
CONSTITUTION 1, 9 (1986). 
 132. Id. at 10. 
 133. Id. at 9. 
 134. Id. at 10. 
 135. Bork, supra note 129, at 823.  
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has departed from the original understanding of the Constitution’s 
principles,” he charged, “it has invariably legislated an item on the 
modern liberal agenda . . . .”136 Not surprisingly, then, when 
conservative appointees gradually came to dominate the Court in the 
late twentieth century, they began shifting its language of constitutional 
jurisprudence back toward positivist principles, this time—unlike the 
prior swing toward constitutional positivism after 1937—shaped to 
serve not the liberal values of the New Deal but the conservative values 
of the post-sixties Republican coalition.137 
The conservatives’ success was striking. Not only did they reshape 
many of the Court’s substantive doctrines, but they also made 
originalism a dominant rhetoric of constitutional argumentation and 
justification. Positivist originalism had seldom been so influential, or at 
least so commonly advanced as the ostensible ground of decision.138  
II.  SOME HISTORICAL LESSONS 
Drawing “lessons” from history is a perilous endeavor. Human 
cultures and social contexts are astonishingly complex as well as 
                                                                                                                     
 136. ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA: THE POLITICAL SEDUCTION OF THE LAW 
130 (1990). On the incoherence of Bork’s “originalism,” see RICHARD A. POSNER, OVERCOMING 
LAW 237–55 (1995).  
For other “originalist” statements, see, for example, Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 724–28 
(1999); Antonin Scalia, Common-Law Courts in a Civil-Law System: The Role of United States 
Federal Courts in Interpreting the Constitution and Laws, in A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: 
FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW 3, 38, 45 (Amy Gutmann ed., 1997) [hereinafter Scalia, 
Common-Law Courts]; Antonin Scalia, Originalism: The Lesser Evil, 57 U. CINN. L. REV. 849 
(1989). It is probably fair to say that most “conservative” theorists adopted some form of “soft” 
positivism and accepted the relevance of moral principles that they believed the Constitution 
incorporated into its text. E.g., Bork, Neutral Principles, supra note 128, at 10 (“Where the 
Constitution does not embody the moral or ethical choice, the judge has no basis other than his 
own values upon which to set aside the community judgment embodied in the statute.”). For 
examples of varied versions of such conservative “soft” positivism, see SCOTT DOUGLAS 
GERBER, TO SECURE THESE RIGHTS: THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE AND CONSTITUTIONAL 
INTERPRETATION 15, 58, 89–90, 197–200 (1995), and LASH, supra note 21, at 84, 88–89. 
 137. See generally THOMAS M. KECK, THE MOST ACTIVIST SUPREME COURT IN HISTORY: 
THE ROAD TO MODERN JUDICIAL CONSERVATISM (2004). For the inconsistent and problematic 
uses of “originalism” by the post-1960s conservative Court, see, for example, DANIEL A. 
FARBER & SUZANNA SHERRY, DESPERATELY SEEKING CERTAINTY: THE MISGUIDED QUEST FOR 
CONSTITUTIONAL FOUNDATIONS 44–54 (2002); Erwin Chemerinsky, Foreword: The Vanishing 
Constitution, 103 HARV. L. REV. 43, 51–53 (1989); Mark A. Graber, Clarence Thomas and the 
Perils of Amateur History, in REHNQUIST JUSTICE: UNDERSTANDING THE COURT DYNAMIC 70 
(Earl M. Maltz ed., 2003). 
 138. See, for example, District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008), where both the 
five-Justice majority, id. at 573 (Scalia, J.), and the four-Justice dissents, id. at 636 (Stevens, J., 
dissenting); id. at 681 (Breyer, J., dissenting), invoked originalist arguments. Although 
conservatives pressed originalism most strongly, liberals also began to employ its rhetoric and 
method. See, e.g., Exec. Order No. 13132, 64 Fed. Reg. 43255 (Aug. 4, 1999).  
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continuously and unevenly changing. However similar, or even 
purportedly “identical,” historical events may seem, they are invariably 
marked by critical differences. Thus, the inexorable realities of change, 
complexity, and variation severely limit the lessons that societies can 
soundly draw from the past. In the case of legal positivism in America, 
however, those very realities help identify three fundamental lessons 
that emerge from positivism’s winding and troubled history. 
A.  Positivism and Democracy 
While history establishes few general lessons, it does demonstrate 
rather convincingly that there is no “necessary” relationship—pro or 
con—between legal positivism and democracy. Thomas Hobbes and 
Austin were no democrats, while many antipositivists, like Fuller, 
surely were.139 Equally, however, history also demonstrates that the 
same is true of the relationship between antipositivism and democracy. 
Theories of natural or divine law—stressing, for example, the moral 
equality of all humans as children of God—can readily serve 
democratic purposes.140 Equally true, however, historical experience 
from Luther and the Inquisition through seventeenth-century 
Massachusetts Puritanism and nineteenth-century Catholic 
authoritarianism to the wide range of shrill and discordant voices in our 
own day that purport to speak in God’s name make it only too apparent 
that ideas about “natural moral orders” and “divine commands” hardly 
                                                                                                                     
 139. Some claim that “legal historians and legal theorists in the main occupy different 
intellectual territories and eschew, where they do not affect to despise, each other’s endeavors.” 
Andrew Lewis, Legal Positivism – Some Lessons From Legal History, in POSITIVISM TODAY 65, 
65 (Stephen Guest ed., 1996); see, e.g., LEITER, supra note 118, at 103–04. On Hobbes and 
Austin as antidemocrats, see supra note 73. 
 140. Father John A. Ryan, for example, was a Catholic priest who defended church 
doctrine and the idea of a natural moral law as vigorously as he defended progressive economic 
ideas and the rights of labor. The Church’s teachings on “natural rights,” he argued, meant that 
“the right to a livelihood and the right to an education will include a greater amount of the 
means of living and greater opportunities of self-improvement in the cases of those who have 
greater needs.” JOHN A. RYAN, A LIVING WAGE: ITS ETHICAL AND ECONOMIC ASPECTS 47 (1906). 
Attacking the Supreme Court’s “liberty of contract” decisions, Ryan quoted Holmes 
approvingly and insisted “no employer can reasonably claim the right to make a contract which 
ignores the natural right of the employee to a decent livelihood.” JOHN A. RYAN, DECLINING 
LIBERTY AND OTHER PAPERS 30 (1927).  
Similarly, Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., a Baptist minister, invoked “the moral law or the law 
of God” when he defended civil disobedience as a method of challenging “unjust laws” that 
imposed racial segregation and discrimination. “One who breaks an unjust law,” he explained, 
“must do so openly, lovingly, and with a willingness to accept the penalty.” MARTIN LUTHER 
KING, JR., WHY WE CAN’T WAIT 94, 95 (1963). In implicitly challenging positivist definitions of 
law, he used the standard image: “We should never forget that everything Adolph Hitler did in 
Germany was ‘legal.’” Id. at 96. 
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lead by necessity to democratic conclusions.141 Just as there is no 
necessary connection between democracy and positivism, there is no 
necessary connection between democracy and antipositivist theories of 
natural or divine law.142 
Similarly, it is clear that there is no necessary connection between 
legal positivism and any form of moral relativism, skepticism, or 
nihilism.143 Indeed, legal positivism could quite logically embrace 
forms of “moral realism” that affirm the objective existence of true and 
binding moral principles.144 While some philosophical versions, such as 
“logical positivism” with its ethical theory of “emotivism,”145 entail 
forms of moral relativism or agnosticism, the narrower and more precise 
ideas of “legal” positivism do not. The “separation” thesis, after all, 
maintains only that law is “distinct” from morality, not that the two are 
unrelated or that the former negates the significance and worth of the 
latter.146 
Thus, for democratic theory the most important lesson of history 
would seem to be that the fundamental premises of any general theory 
                                                                                                                     
 141. For recent studies of the varied and often conflicting roles and political uses of 
religion in American politics, see, for example, KELLY J. BAKER, GOSPEL ACCORDING TO THE 
KLAN: THE KKK’S APPEAL TO PROTESTANT AMERICA, 1915–1930 (2011); DENIS LACORNE, 
RELIGION IN AMERICA: A POLITICAL HISTORY (George Holoch trans., 2011); STEPHEN H. 
MARSHALL, THE CITY ON THE HILL FROM BELOW: THE CRISIS OF PROPHETIC BLACK POLITICS 
(2011); DAN MCKANAN, PROPHETIC ENCOUNTERS: RELIGION AND THE AMERICAN RADICAL 
TRADITION (2011); AXEL R. SCHÄFER, COUNTERCULTURAL CONSERVATIVES: AMERICAN 
EVANGELICALISM FROM THE POSTWAR REVIVAL TO THE NEW CHRISTIAN RIGHT (2011); TOBIN 
MILLER SHEARER, DAILY DEMONSTRATORS: THE CIVIL RIGHTS MOVEMENT IN MENNONITE 
HOMES AND SANCTUARIES (2010). 
 142. “Doubtless the natural law theorist cannot plausibly make strong claims about the 
ready and uncontroversial knowability of particular moral truths, if for no other reason than the 
protracted irreconcilability of moral beliefs held by undoubted leading natural law theorists.” R. 
George Wright, Natural Law in the Post-Modern Era, 36 AM. J. JURIS. 203, 206 (1991) 
(reviewing NATURAL LAW THEORY: CONTEMPORARY ESSAYS (Robert P. George ed., 1992)). For 
examples of the diversity among natural law theorists, see NATURAL LAW THEORY, supra. 
 143. For an interesting argument that there is no necessary logical connection between 
legal positivism and democratic theory but that they are nonetheless largely consistent, see 
Jeremy Waldron, Can There Be a Democratic Jurisprudence?, 58 EMORY L.J. 675 (2009).  
 144. For a modern philosophical version, see ALAN GEWIRTH, REASON AND MORALITY 
(1978), and Gewirth’s response to comments in Alan Gewirth, Replies to My Critics, in 
GEWIRTH’S ETHICAL RATIONALISM: CRITICAL ESSAYS WITH A REPLY BY ALAN GEWIRTH 192 
(Edward Regis, Jr. ed., 1984). 
 145. Ashby, supra note 98, at 505–06. 
 146. “[T]he divine law is the measure or test of positive law and morality: or (changing the 
phrase) law and morality, in so far as they are what they ought to be, conform, or are not 
repugnant, to the law of God.” AUSTIN, supra note 5, at 6. “The law is the witness and external 
deposit of our moral life. Its history is the history of the moral development of the race.” 
HOLMES, supra note 56, at 170. For an interesting effort to rethink positivism’s separation of 
law and morality, see Jules L. Coleman, The Architecture of Jurisprudence, 121 YALE L.J. 2 
(2011). 
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have little determinative power and that it is the “intermediate 
premises” and embedded, if implicit, culturally based significations that 
determine, at any given time and place, a general theory’s practical 
implications. It is not the abstract “principles” that control but the 
particular, granulated, and ingrained cultural values and assumptions 
that inform them. Those values and assumptions infuse concrete social 
and political meaning into general theories, narrow the scope of 
interpretive possibilities, and guide the understanding of those who 
apply them in practice. 
The radical changes in significance that Americans in the 1940s 
attributed to “positivist” and “natural-law” ideas confirm the political 
elasticity of jurisprudential theories. The practical meanings of both sets 
of ideas arose not from their intrinsic nature but from changing 
historical contexts and the changing goals and values of those who used 
them. Holmes illustrates the point.147 “All my life,” he wrote in 1916, “I 
have sneered at the natural rights of man.”148 That statement, and a raft 
of others like it, led many to find his ideas repulsive, immoral, and 
profoundly antidemocratic.149 It is equally true, however, that Holmes’ 
personal moral code was traditional and honorable, that his commitment 
to American government and its constitutional order was deep and 
genuine, and that his relationship to democracy was far more complex 
than his sneer about “natural rights” might suggest. Indeed, if Holmes 
appeared antidemocratic to some, he appeared to others as both an 
exemplar and spokesman for a compelling theory of democracy.150 In 
fact, during the century and a half since the Civil War, legal positivists 
as well as antipositivists in the United States have commonly been 
democrats of one variety or another, and it seems clear that it was not 
their positivism or antipositivism that dictated their democratic affinities 
but, rather, their democratic affinities that shaped the political 
conclusions they read into their contradictory views of positivism. On 
the most general level, then, Richard Rorty surely hit the mark when he 
concluded that, in determining political values and assumptions, 
“democracy takes precedence over philosophy.”151 
                                                                                                                     
 147. Pound illustrates the same point, but with a different twist. An ostensibly 
“democratic” theorist, he in fact viewed “democracy” with some disdain. “The wail of the 
unfit,” he wrote in 1915, “is very apt to be made in the name of the Demos.” WIGDOR, supra 
note 92, at 199 (internal quotation marks omitted). Pound “put little faith in the wisdom of the 
masses” and “was not troubled by the antidemocratic implications of social engineering.” Id.  
 148. Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. to Harold J. Laski (Sept. 15, 1916), supra note 56, at 21. 
 149. See, e.g., ALSCHULER, supra note 109; John C. Ford, The Totalitarian Justice Holmes, 
159 CATH. WORLD 114 (1944); Francis E. Lucey, Natural Law and American Legal Realism: 
Their Respective Contributions to a Theory of Law in a Democratic Society, 30 GEO. L.J. 493 
(1942). 
 150. PURCELL, supra note 97, at 207–09. 
 151. 1 RICHARD RORTY, OBJECTIVITY, RELATIVISM, AND TRUTH: PHILOSOPHICAL PAPERS 
192 (1991). Rorty declared that pragmatism is “neutral between democrats and fascists,” a claim 
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General principles are essential to organize, guide, and test our 
thinking, but they are by their nature indeterminate and manipulable in 
their implications. If people truly believe in democratic principles and 
values, one need not know whether they believe in science or the Bible, 
tradition or natural law, historical inevitability or—as Mark Twain 
might have said—the Deity him- or her-self. Indeed, one need not know 
whether people who claim to believe in God believe that their God is 
“good” or “great,” “angry” or “merciful,” “exacting” or “loving.” What 
one needs to know, rather, is exactly what implications and conclusions 
people draw from those principles and beliefs and, in particular, what 
they think those principles and beliefs allow or compel them to do to 
control, exploit, punish, imprison, or kill other people.152  
While it is essential to recognize the contingent nature of the 
relationship between legal positivism and democracy, it seems equally 
important to note that such “contingency” does not mean that there is no 
logic that can reasonably shape positivist principles into an intellectual 
support for democratic values. Indeed, as many theorists show, 
positivist ideas—in both narrow jurisprudential forms as well as broader 
philosophical ones—are readily understood as compatible with 
democratic principles and easily used to reinforce and justify those 
principles. One of John Dewey’s most far-reaching contributions was to 
suggest some of the ways in which naturalism, relativism, pragmatism, 
and the rejection of “absolutism” in law and morality support and 
strengthen democratic ideals and practices.153 More recently, Professor 
Jeremy Waldron similarly suggested ways in which the narrower 
principles of legal positivism can lead to the same result. Positivism’s 
“sources thesis” can serve to legitimate constitutional government, 
promote political accountability, and affirm limits on official discretion 
and power, while its “social thesis” can support the need for 
transparency in governmental processes, popular access to information 
                                                                                                                     
that would depend in the first instance on how, exactly, one defined pragmatism. Richard Rorty, 
The Professor and the Prophet, 52 TRANSITION 70, 75 (1991) (book review). For a different view 
of pragmatism, see ROBERT B. WESTBROOK, DEMOCRATIC HOPE: PRAGMATISM AND THE POLITICS 
OF TRUTH (2005). 
 152. Prior to his arrest in 2005, Bernardo Provenzano, the man regarded as the supreme 
leader of the Sicilian mafia for the previous forty-three years, reportedly sent instructions to his 
underlings in secret, hand-carried written messages in which “there was always a mention of 
God and his will and protection.” Andrea Camilleri, When a Godfather Becomes Expendable, 
N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 21, 2006), http://www.nytimes.com/2006/04/21/opinion/21camilleri.html. 
 153. In the late 1930s, Dewey began to explore the relationship between culture and 
democracy and to identify the cultural and social roots of democratic values. E.g., JOHN DEWEY, 
FREEDOM AND CULTURE (1939); see PURCELL, supra note 97, 200–17; WESTBROOK, supra note 
151. For general studies of Dewey and his contributions to naturalistic democratic theory, see 
RYAN, supra note 93, and ROBERT B. WESTBROOK, JOHN DEWEY AND AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 
(1991). For an effort to revive and develop from Dewey’s work an “epistemological” defense of 
democracy, see HILARY PUTNAM, RENEWING PHILOSOPHY 180–202 (1992). 
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about “public” matters, and continuing and informed consent by the 
citizenry.154  
Indeed, Waldron suggests—as Dewey did—that the recognition of 
moral disagreements and the willingness to hold in abeyance all 
allegedly “absolute” values serves the cause of toleration, individual 
freedom, and peaceful democratic government.155 “Democrats, more 
than most other political theorists, are sensitive to the realities of moral 
disagreement,” Waldron explained.156 Thus, democrats “believe these 
disagreements should be resolved politically by fair procedures of 
voting; but they have no reason to say that anyone is required to change 
his opinion about justice simply because he was defeated in a fair 
vote.”157 Thus, democratic theorists will readily distinguish between the 
fairness of electoral procedures and the substantive moral quality of the 
decisions that follow. “And this,” Waldron concludes, “will be 
something like a democratic version of the separability thesis.”158 
Thus, positivism can serve as an intellectual support for democratic 
government and a prescriptive guide for exploring many of its 
problems. The extent to which it will actually serve those purposes, 
however, will depend not on positivist theory itself, legal or 
philosophical, but on the “intermediate premises” and specific cultural 
values that inspire the goals and inform the reasoning of those who seek 
to use it. 
B.  Positivism and American Constitutional Law 
Unlike its relationship to democracy, legal positivism’s relationship 
to constitutional law seems more direct and readily apparent. In 
positivist terms, the Constitution is the authoritative “source” of 
American law; its provisions are “separate” from the personal moral 
values of those who interpret it; and all lawful acts of the national 
government must be “traceable” to its provisions. Thus, American 
constitutionalism and the very idea of a written constitution readily 
reflect ideas associated with legal positivism. 
Even if one embraces those positivist principles, however, they do 
                                                                                                                     
 154. Waldron, supra note 143. Along somewhat compatible lines, Barry Friedman 
emphasized the “social” bases that support the constitutional practice of judicial review and 
legitimate it as a tool of democratic government, while Morton J. Horwitz stressed the extent to 
which “natural rights” ideas frequently served conservative and anti-egalitarian purposes. See, 
e.g., Barry Friedman, The History of the Countermajoritarian Difficulty, Part Four: Law’s 
Politics, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 971, 980, 983–84 (2000); Morton J. Horwitz, Rights, 23 HARV. 
C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 393, 399–403 (1988). 
 155. PURCELL, supra note 97, at 200–02, 211–12. 
 156. Waldron, supra note 143, at 700. 
 157. Id. (emphasis in original). 
 158. Id. For a thoughtful analysis along similar lines, see JETHRO K. LIEBERMAN, 
LIBERALISM UNDRESSED (2012). 
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not carry us far in the difficult tasks of constitutional interpretation. 
They do not specify how the general values and general structural 
principles incorporated in the Constitution are to be given specific 
content and application in individual cases, and they do not specify how 
we are to understand and apply in new and changing situations the 
broad or abstract terms in the authoritative “source.”159 Nor do they 
specify any specific methods for determining whether controversial 
policies or decisions are, in fact, properly “traceable” to that 
authoritative source. Understandably, those inadequacies generated 
disputes from the nation’s beginning.  
The pattern was set at the new government’s birth. Those who 
supported ratification described—and praised—the Constitution’s 
language as clear and the powers it granted to the proposed national 
government as limited; those who opposed ratification described—and 
condemned—its language as vague and the powers it granted to the 
national government as vast and undefined. Once the Constitution went 
into effect, however, there was a marked reversal in their constitutional 
views. Those who had supported ratification and subsequently took 
control of the new national government began to insist that the 
Constitution’s language was general and that it granted broad and ample  
powers. Conversely, those who had opposed ratification and went into 
opposition began to insist that its language was clear and that it granted 
only narrow and limited powers.160 From the beginning then, the 
Constitution’s meaning and the proper methods for ascertaining that 
meaning were sharply contested and shaped by the values and purposes 
of its interpreters. While its basic institution-specifying provisions were 
relatively clear and generally determinative, its systemic, operational, 
and rights-granting provisions were not. As the changing attitudes of the 
founders after 1787 suggested, in those latter areas it was not the 
constitutional text but the perspectives of its interpreters—where they 
stood in the institutional structure and what they sought to 
accomplish—that proved critical and often decisive. 
As a normative matter, in fact, both agreement and disagreement—
albeit on quite different levels—marked the way Americans thought 
about the Constitution’s meaning. On one hand, they generally agreed 
that it contained a relatively clear and definite meaning and that moral 
                                                                                                                     
 159. These would include the Constitution’s “axial” principles of federalism and separation 
of powers, related general principles such as “checks and balances” and popular accountability, 
and any number of specific provisions and words including, for example, U.S. CONST. pmbl., 
“Justice,” “general Welfare,” and “Blessings of Liberty”, id. art. I, § 8, cl. 1, “general Welfare,” 
id. art. IV, § 2, “Privileges and Immunities of Citizens,” id. art. IV, § 4, guaranteeing to each 
state a “Republican Form of Government,” id. amend. IV, “right of the people to be secure in 
their persons, houses, papers and effects,” id. amend V, “due process of law,” and id. amend. 
XIV, “due process” and “equal protection of the laws.” 
 160. PURCELL, supra note 31, at 24–34. 
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values and principles were relevant in determining that meaning. On the 
other hand, they regularly disagreed about the actual content of that 
meaning, the application of the values and principles it incorporated, 
and the relevance of the moral values and principles it did not explicitly 
itemize. While Americans believed that the Constitution had a definite 
and ascertainable meaning and that its proper interpretation was cabined 
by moral principles, they nonetheless constantly disagreed about the 
content of that meaning and the nature and implications of those 
cabining moral principles.161 Consequently, the Constitution became 
both a preeminent symbol of national unity and the continuous focus of 
political dispute. 
Thus, legal-positivist assumptions, though compatible with 
American constitutionalism in theory, provided little actual 
interpretative direction on controversial issues. Increasingly, 
commentators recognized that simple theories of written 
constitutionalism and legal positivism did not begin to describe their 
actual constitutional practice.162 Several factors contributed to that 
sharpening recognition. One was the nation’s lengthening history of 
seemingly ceaseless constitutional dispute. Another was the gradual 
breakdown of what was a widely shared politico–religious–cultural 
assumption that the legal system was underwritten by a discernible, 
overarching, and divinely inspired moral order. A third was the growing 
recognition in the decades after the Civil War that the nation was 
changing rapidly and that interpretations of the Constitution should 
change—and in fact were changing—in response. A fourth was the 
spreading impact of Darwinism and the theories of social and cultural 
evolution it spawned, theories that assumed that change ruled all 
things—not only animal species but also human customs, societies, 
institutions, ways of thinking, and moral values themselves.163 Finally, a 
                                                                                                                     
 161. American attitudes toward law were confused and ambiguous during the revolutionary 
period, and the constitutional theory forged and implemented in the 1780s remained “diffusive 
and open-ended.” WOOD, supra note 19, at 291–305, 615. For recent efforts to reconcile the 
various “sources” of American constitutional law, see AKHIL REED AMAR, AMERICA’S 
UNWRITTEN CONSTITUTION: THE PRECEDENTS AND PRINCIPLES WE LIVE BY (2012); BALKIN, 
supra note 2; LAURENCE H. TRIBE, THE INVISIBLE CONSTITUTION (2008). 
 162. With respect to the legal systems of England and the United States, Jeremy Waldron 
notes, “descriptive positivism is almost certainly false.” WALDRON, supra note 118, at 166. 
 163. “The influence of Darwin upon philosophy,” Dewey declared in 1909, “resides in his 
having conquered the phenomena of life for the principle of transition, and thereby freed the 
new logic for application to mind and morals and life.” JOHN DEWEY, THE INFLUENCE OF 
DARWIN ON PHILOSOPHY AND OTHER ESSAYS IN CONTEMPORARY THOUGHT 8–9 (1910). “The 
morality of a group at a time is the sum of the taboos and prescriptions in the folkways by which 
right conduct is defined. Therefore morals can never be intuitive. They are historical, 
institutional, and empirical.” WILLIAM GRAHAM SUMNER, FOLKWAYS: A STUDY OF THE 
SOCIOLOGICAL IMPORTANCE OF USAGES, MANNERS, CUSTOMS, MORES, AND MORALS 29 (1906). 
See generally, e.g., CRAVENS, supra note 42 (discussing further Darwin’s impact). 
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swelling chorus of legal writers began to argue that the law’s driving 
source was not logic but experience and that, in Holmes’s words, the 
“felt necessities of the time” were far more important in its evolution 
than “the syllogism.”164 By the early decades of the twentieth century 
many American legal thinkers were ready to agree with Felix 
Frankfurter’s contention that it was “sheer illusion” to believe that the 
power of judicial review was “exercised by distilling meaning out of the 
words of the Constitution.”165 
Increasingly, then, the theses of legal positivism came in practice to 
serve not as interpretive principles that provided actual direction but, 
rather, as rhetorical munitions for those who disagreed with the 
constitutional decisions of the courts. By the early twentieth century the 
charge that conservative judges were “reading their personal values” 
into the Constitution—the point of Holmes’s renowned dissent in 
Lochner v. New York166—became the common refrain of Progressives 
across the land. Positivist assumptions—that “law” was separate from 
morals, rooted in social practices, and valid only when traceable to an 
authoritative constitutional source—became staples of Progressive 
rhetoric and established themselves at the core of anti-Court polemics. 
Indeed, the “harder” the positivist stance, the easier and more powerful 
the charge of judicial wrong-doing; and, reversing the relationship, the 
more one wished to undermine the legitimacy of judicial decisions, the 
greater the utility of a “hard” positivist stance. 
The subsequent history of positivist, anti-Court rhetoric highlighted 
four general characteristics of the nation’s constitutional politics. First, 
positivist principles proved plausible and effective polemical tools, and 
those who opposed the Court’s reigning jurisprudence regularly took 
them up.167 When the Roosevelt Court gave way to the Warren Court 
and the Justices turned the federal judicial power vigorously to liberal 
nationalist ends, for example, the political salience of positivist ideas 
                                                                                                                     
 164. HOLMES, supra note 58, at 1. 
 165. Felix Frankfurter, Mr. Justice Holmes and the Constitution: A Review of His Twenty-
Five Years on the Supreme Court, 41 HARV. L. REV. 121, 125 (1927).  
The words of these [constitutional] provisions are so unrestrained by their 
intrinsic meaning as well as by their history and traditions, that each Justice is 
impelled to depend upon his own controlling conceptions, which are in turn 
bound by his experience and imagination, his hopes and fears, his faith and 
doubts.  
Id. at 126. 
 166. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 74–76 (1905) (Holmes, J., dissenting). 
 167. See, e.g., Barry Friedman, The History of the Countermajoritarian Difficulty, Part 
Three: The Lesson of Lochner, 76 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1383, 1428–38 (2001); Barry Friedman, The 
Birth of an Academic Obsession: The History of the Countermajoritarian Difficulty, Part Five, 
112 YALE L.J. 153 (2002) [hereinafter Barry, Part Five]; Friedman, supra note 154. 
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changed. Suddenly, the Court’s liberal defenders began to develop 
theories of individual rights which often sounded suspiciously like 
refurbished versions of “natural rights,” while its conservative critics 
picked up the old Progressive rhetoric of legal positivism and insisted 
that constitutional principles were distinct from moral principles and 
that the Court’s only role was to construe the explicit text and “original” 
understanding of the Constitution.168 
Second, positivist ideas did not, in fact, particularly constrain even 
those who advanced them most forcefully. Although Progressives who 
went on the bench after the New Deal struggled to root their decisions 
in authoritative constitutional sources, their decisions and theories 
nonetheless tended over the years to reflect distinctively “progressive,” 
New Deal, and liberal values. Similarly, “conservatives” who began to 
fill the federal bench after 1969 voiced similar positivist principles,169 
but their decisions reflected not the consistent use of originalist and 
textualist methods, but the substantive values and policies of the post-
Sixties Republican coalition.170 
                                                                                                                     
 168. See, e.g., Barry, Part Five, supra note 167. 
 169. See, e.g., BORK, supra note 136, at 251–59; John F. Manning, What Divides 
Textualists from Purposivists?, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 70 (2006); Jonathan T. Molot, The Rise and 
Fall of Textualism, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1 (2006); Rehnquist, supra note 129; Scalia, Common-
Law Courts, supra note 136, at 3–47. 
 170. See, e.g., Purcell, supra note 130; supra sources cited in note 137. In spite of their 
positivistic rhetoric, for example, the Court’s conservative Justices repeatedly expanded the 
scope of the Eleventh Amendment to limit federal judicial and legislative power as they 
narrowed or invalidated a number of federal regulatory and civil rights statutes. Their 
interpretation bore essentially no relation to the amendment’s text. Indeed, they easily dismissed 
an argument based on the actual text as an irrelevant “straw man.” Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 
517 U.S. 44, 69 (1996) (Rehnquist, C.J.). Three years later, as they demonstrated the elasticity 
of both their originalism and their positivism, they announced that they looked to “the original 
understanding of the Constitution” and that the Eleventh Amendment stood for “fundamental 
postulates implicit in the constitutional design” and that the amendment incorporated into the 
Constitution a preexisting common law sovereign immunity. Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 
727–29 (1999) (Kennedy, J.). 
Similarly, Justice Scalia embraced the “positivist” doctrine of Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 
304 U.S. 64 (1938), in order to restrict claims under the Alien Tort Statute, see Sosa v. Alvarez-
Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 739, 745 (2004) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the 
judgment), but ignored Erie’s positivism when he wished to establish a judge-made defense 
against tort claims, see Boyle v. United Techs. Corp., 487 U.S. 500 (1988) (Scalia, J.) (making 
no reference to Erie); cf. id. at 516–19 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (discussing Erie). On the 
pervasive inconsistencies in Scalia’s positivistic “textualism,” see Richard A. Posner, The 
Incoherence of Antonin Scalia, NEW REPUBLIC (Aug. 24, 2012), http://www.newrepublic.com/
article/magazine/books-and-arts/106441/scalia-garner-reading-the-law-textual-originalism.  
On the ideological and political biases of the Court’s “conservatives” after 1969, see 
AWAKENING FROM THE DREAM: CIVIL RIGHTS UNDER SIEGE AND THE NEW STRUGGLE FOR EQUAL 
JUSTICE (Denise C. Morgan, Rachel D. Godsil & Joy Moses, eds., 2006); THE BURGER COURT: 
POLITICAL AND JUDICIAL PROFILES (Charles M. Lamb & Stephen C. Halpern eds., 1991); KECK, 
supra note 137, at 107–283; EARL M. MALTZ, THE CHIEF JUSTICESHIP OF WARREN BURGER, 
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The Court’s recent opinion in District of Columbia v. Heller171 
illustrates the point. There, announcing “our adoption of the original 
understanding of the Second Amendment,”172 a five-Justice 
conservative majority reshaped the amendment’s historical meaning by 
excluding ordinary military weapons from its scope and extending its 
coverage to reach handguns held in the home for personal protection.173 
They construed the amendment, in other words, to reject a relatively 
clear “original” purpose of the amendment (to ensure the right to hold 
“ordinary” military weapons for militia service and for protection 
against governmental tyranny), while remolding it to serve a purpose 
that began to gather substantial strength only in the nineteenth century 
(to ensure the right to hold handguns for personal protection). Support 
for the latter purpose rose and fell for more than a century before it was 
vigorously advanced in the twentieth century by organized lobbying 
efforts, growing fears of modern urban crime, and the Republican 
Party’s embrace of an ideology of “gun rights.”174 Thus, the majority 
opinion reveals the easy malleability of “originalist” argumentation, the 
compelling power of changing social and political pressures, and 
ultimately the enduring fact that the “living” nature of the Constitution, 
however much denied or condemned, stands as an intrinsic 
characteristic of American law and government.175 
Third, the use of positivist ideas to attack the judiciary became 
habitual and reflected a fundamental change in American law and 
governance since the Civil War. As the Supreme Court became 
increasingly active and its decisions increasingly far-reaching, larger 
numbers of Americans grew concerned about the nature of its decisions 
and the legitimacy of its expanding role. As the Court became an ever 
                                                                                                                     
1969–1986 (2000); DAVID G. SAVAGE, TURNING RIGHT: THE MAKING OF THE REHNQUIST 
SUPREME COURT (1992); JAMES F. SIMON, THE CENTER HOLDS: THE POWER STRUGGLE INSIDE 
THE REHNQUIST COURT (1995); TINSLEY E. YARBROUGH, THE REHNQUIST COURT AND THE 
CONSTITUTION (2000). 
 171. 128 S. Ct. 2783 (2008) (Scalia, J.). 
 172. Id. at 2816. Heller also illustrated the elasticity of the majority’s positivist originalism, 
for the majority opinion combined an elaborate textualism with the non-positivist assertion that 
the Second Amendment protected a “pre-existing right” that was, whatever its nature, not 
dependent on the actual text of the Constitution. Id. at 2797. Thus, as with their Eleventh 
Amendment jurisprudence, supra note 170, the conservative Justices were highly flexible in 
deciding when and how to apply their originalist and positivist principles. 
 173. Id. at 2817–18. The dissents present much of the historical evidence that contradicts 
the majority’s position. Id. at 2822 (Stevens, J., dissenting); id. at 2847 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 174. See, e.g., Reva B. Siegel, Dead or Alive: Originalism as Popular Constitutionalism in 
Heller, 122 HARV. L. REV. 191 (2008); Robert Leider, Our Non-Originalist Right to Bear Arms, 
89 IND. L.J. 1587 (2014); David C. Williams, Civic Republicanism and the Citizen Militia: The 
Terrifying Second Amendment, 101 YALE L.J. 551 (1991). 
 175. Jack M. Balkin, The Roots of the Living Constitution, 92 B.U. L. REV. 1129, 1144 
(2012). Justice Scalia, the author of the majority opinion in Heller, has rejected the idea of a 
“living” Constitution. Scalia, Common-Law Courts, supra note 136, at 37–47. 
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more prominent force in national affairs, the need to establish limits on 
its power seemed ever more important. Hence, the Court’s critics 
invoked positivist ideas more frequently against the judiciary, and the 
problem of identifying or creating proper limits on the judicial power 
loomed ever more important in the twentieth and early twenty-first 
century. 
Finally, the use of legal positivist ideas was consistently uneven and 
partisan in the treatment of governmental power. American legal 
thinkers seldom wished to impose the restrictions of legal positivism 
rigidly and across the board because they seldom wished to limit all 
levels and branches of government equally. Indeed, Progressives sought 
to limit the judiciary in order to expand the power of the legislature, 
while anti-Progressives sought to expand judicial power in order to limit 
the legislature. Similarly, contemporary “conservatives” who invoke 
positivist ideas to limit both the legislative and judicial branches mock 
those ideas when they attribute unprecedented, unchecked, and wholly 
unspecified powers to the executive.176 Indeed, they equally mock those 
ideas when they choose to assert the judicial power expansively in the 
service of their own ideological goals.177 The positivist ideas that served 
both Progressives and modern conservatives so well in their efforts to 
limit one branch of government seemed of much less use in their 
concurrent efforts to expand the powers of another more favored 
branch. In each case, it was political commitment and partisan utility, 
not the application of positivist principles or the text of the Constitution, 
that determined which branch the various groups sought to empower 
and which to shackle.  
Indeed, the very structure of American government made classical 
legal positivism an unavoidably ambiguous and politically erratic 
constitutional guide for two related reasons. First, the Constitution did 
not confer “sovereignty” on any one unit or branch of government.178 
                                                                                                                     
 176. For defenses of the theory of the “unitary executive,” see, for example, STEVEN G. 
CALABRESI & CHRISTOPHER S. YOO, THE UNITARY EXECUTIVE: PRESIDENTIAL POWER FROM 
WASHINGTON TO BUSH (2008); Steven G. Calabresi & Kevin H. Rhodes, The Structural 
Constitution: Unitary Executive, Plural Judiciary, 105 HARV. L. REV. 1153 (1992); Saikrishna 
Bangalore Prakash, Note, Hail to the Chief Administrator: The Framers and the President’s 
Administrative Powers, 102 YALE L.J. 991 (1993). The decisive issue is not whether the 
executive is “unitary” in some administrative sense, but instead, how broadly its powers may 
stretch in practice and whether and how the law and the other branches of government may limit 
it. 
 177. See, e.g., Shelby County v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612 (2013); supra notes 137, 170. 
 178. Sovereignty was a foundational concept in classic legal positivism, AUSTIN, supra 
note 5, at 199–200, 267–68, and Hart retained the concept while he qualified and refined it, e.g., 
HART, supra note 3, at 79–81. The Founders placed “sovereignty” in “the people,” though the 
Constitution severely restricted the ability of “the people” to exercise their ultimate power. See, 
e.g., JACK N. RAKOVE, ORIGINAL MEANINGS: POLITICS AND IDEAS IN THE MAKING OF THE 
CONSTITUTION 105–08 (1996) (discussing how the framers were aware of the radical 
possibilities of the idea of popular sovereignty and sought to restrict it in the ratification 
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Rather, it limited all the levels and branches of government, and it 
divided national power among three separate branches in a way that 
gave each the power to “check” the others. Given both the divided 
structure of American government and the existence of “checking” 
powers in each of the national branches, “sovereignty” resided in no 
single institution, and the principles of legal positivism could 
consequently do no more than highlight the contested nature of 
imprecisely defined and potentially checking branch powers.  
Second, the Constitution required its interpreters not only to define 
the power of one federal branch against another, but also to define 
various national powers against state powers and, further, to delineate 
constitutional lines of authority in disputes that involve complex inter-
level and inter-branch combinations: two federal branches against a 
third; one informal group of states against another; one or more federal 
branches allied with a coalition of states against one or more other 
federal branches allied with a different coalition of states.179 The 
practical problems of American constitutional law and politics, in other 
words, did not usually pit one unit of government against another. 
Instead, they ordinarily pitted varied and shifting combinations of 
diverse local, state, regional, and national units against one another. 
Insofar as positivist ideas suggested the existence of some clear and 
stable allocation of constitutional authority, that allocation was anything 
                                                                                                                     
process). In modern political theory, many often identify “sovereignty” with the legislature, as 
the “popular” and “law making” branch of government. Lon Fuller, for example, had his 
positivist spokesman, Judge Keen, affirm “a clear-cut principle, which is the supremacy of the 
legislative branch” and declare that “[f]rom that principle flows the obligation of the judiciary to 
enforce faithfully the written law, and to interpret that law in accordance with its plain meaning 
without reference to our personal desires or our individual conceptions of justice.” Lon L. 
Fuller, The Case of the Speluncean Explorers, 62 HARV. L. REV. 616, 633 (1949). The 
Federalist, of course, warned repeatedly against the dangers of legislative power. E.g., THE 
FEDERALIST NO. 49, at 339–40 (James Madison) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961) (arguing that the 
legislative department “possesses so many means of operating on the motives of the other 
departments”); id. NO. 48, at 333 (James Madison) (“The legislative department is every where 
extending the sphere of its activity, and drawing all power into its impetuous vortex.”); id. NO. 
71, at 483 (Alexander Hamilton) (“The tendency of the legislative authority to absorb every 
other [authority], has been fully displayed and illustrated by examples . . . .”).  
 179. PURCELL, supra note 31, at 38–52. Classic examples are United States v. Curtiss-
Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 319–20 (1936), upholding a delegation of power on the 
ground that both congressional and executive power combined to support it, and United States v. 
Klein, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 128 (1872), relying on a combination of executive and judicial power 
to limit the power of Congress to control federal jurisdiction. Similarly, Justice Sandra Day 
O’Connor argued that the power of Congress over federal jurisdiction, in particular its power to 
deny jurisdiction over federal constitutional claims, was at its broadest when the claims 
implicated “the core of ‘the very delicate, plenary and exclusive power of the President as the 
sole organ of the federal government in the field of international relations.’” Webster v. Doe, 
486 U.S. 592, 605–06 (1988) (O’Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (quoting 
Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. at 320).  
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but clear and stable in practice because the complex and interdependent 
powers of the various levels and branches of American government 
continuously changed in their uses and realigned their relationships.180 
In such a system even the most exacting forms of positivism could offer 
little if any consistent and generally acceptable interpretative guidance 
on disputed constitutional issues. 
C.  Positivism and Its Potential Virtues for Constitutional Democracies 
In spite of its contingent relationship with both democracy and 
constitutionalism, legal positivism has one paramount virtue with 
respect to the principles and values that underlie each.181 It focuses 
attention on the actual operations of the legal system. Centrally, 
classical positivism identified law as a social and behavioral 
phenomenon. Its “sources” thesis looked to existent de facto authority; 
its “social” thesis highlighted the necessity of actual behavioral 
compliance; and its “separation” thesis proclaimed a divide between 
rules claimed to be morally right and those followed and enforced in 
practice.182 Whatever his exact meaning, even Hart—despite his 
technical philosophical method and focus on “general” rules—described 
his own major work, The Concept of Law, as “an essay in descriptive 
sociology.”183  
Most fundamentally, then, legal positivism by its very nature points 
to a focus on the social workings and practical operations of the law. 
One of its major contributions to American legal thought, in fact, was 
the impetus that its “social” focus gave to the development of 
“sociological” and “realist” perspectives on law and government. Pound 
gave classic formulation to what, in truth, should be recognized as legal 
                                                                                                                     
 180. PURCELL, supra note 31, at 85–110. As Doni Gewirtzman has argued, for example, the 
“authoritative” federal judiciary is itself pluralistic and diverse, and the rulings of the lower 
courts are often only tangentially related to, or sometimes even at odds, with Supreme Court 
precedents. Doni Gewirtzman, Lower Court Constitutionalism: Circuit Court Discretion in a 
Complex Adaptive System, 61 AM. U. L. REV. 457 (2012). 
 181. Positivism could have different uses and implications in legal systems built on 
different normative principles, such as theocracies or single-party dictatorships. 
 182. “Law also as well as sovereignty is a fact.” Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. to Harold J. 
Laski (Sept. 15, 1916), supra note 56, at 21. 
 183. HART, supra note 3, at vi.  
My aim in this book was to provide a theory of what law is which is both 
general and descriptive. It is general in the sense that it is not tied to any 
particular legal system or legal culture, but seeks to give an explanatory and 
clarifying account of law as a complex social and political institution with a 
rule-governed (and in that sense ‘normative’) aspect. 
Id. at 239. Whatever Hart meant, his characterization retained positivism’s concern with the de 
facto world of human behavior. See Schauer, supra note 114, at 860. 
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positivism’s second “separation” thesis184: the proposition that the “law 
in books” is separate from the “law in action.” There is no necessary 
connection between the two, Pound suggested, and a yawning gulf may 
divide them.185 There are, consequently, not two but three distinct areas 
involved in the proper study of law—not just the realms of morality and 
rules, but also the arena of practice.186 
That arena is both complex and multifaceted, for it includes all of the 
social factors that affect the way “the law” functions in practice, 
anything and everything that shapes the ways in which disputes are 
generated, perceived, constructed, channeled, and resolved.187 It 
includes, in other words, the ways in which “Justice” and the 
Constitution’s other substantive values are—or are not—actually 
served.188 Karl Llewellyn captured this insight in his famous essay that 
helped launch “legal realism.” The “law in books” states that a person 
has “a right to the performance of a contract,” he wrote, but that “right 
could rather more accurately be phrased somewhat as follows”: 
if the other party does not perform as agreed, you can sue, 
                                                                                                                     
 184. Pound’s “positivist” inspiration came primarily from Darwinism, pragmatism, and 
progressive reform ideas rather than from Austin. WIGDOR, supra note 92, at 183–206. Pound, 
moreover, was a severe critic of the “analytic” jurisprudence that was developed by Langdell 
and his disciples, an approach that Pound scored as “mechanical” jurisprudence. Id. at 167–69.  
 185. Roscoe Pound, Law in Books and Law in Action, 44 AM. L. REV. 12 (1910). The 
“basic content” of this essay and Pound’s other early work, Karl Llewellyn wrote, “is the basis 
of our forward-looking thought of the ’20’s and ’30’s and has provided half of the commonplace 
equipment on and with which our work since has builded.” KARL N. LLEWELLYN, 
JURISPRUDENCE: REALISM IN THEORY AND PRACTICE 496 (1962).  
 186. Discussing “the rule of law,” Ronald Dworkin adopted the familiar dualism when he 
considered “two very different conceptions” of law, the “rule-book conception” and the “rights 
conception.” DWORKIN, A MATTER OF PRINCIPLE, supra note 121, at 11 (internal quotation marks 
omitted). He saw the former as a positivist conception that focused on adherence to written rules 
and the latter as a moral conception based on the principle “that citizens have moral rights and 
duties” that the state must honor. Id. Dworkin, of course, criticized the first and affirmed the 
second. That traditional dichotomy, however, slights the critical fact that social practice often 
fails to honor both “legal rules” and “moral rights.” Thus, any serious examination of a “rule of 
law” requires a third category, one that focuses on social behavior, highlights the extent to 
which practice may frustrate or ignore both “rules” and “rights” in practice, and inspires the 
search for strategies, incentives, and mechanisms designed to maximize the extent to which all 
members of a democratic society actually enjoy the benefit of such rules and rights. 
 187. It includes, for example, the ways in which modern electronic arts portray and 
understand “law” and the “legal system.” See Austin Sarat, Imagining the Law of the Father: 
Loss, Dread, and Mourning in The Sweet Hereafter, 34 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 3 (2000) (discussing 
a film); Richard K. Sherwin, Law’s Enchantment: The Cinematic Jurisprudence of Krzysztof 
Kieslowski, in 7 LAW AND POPULAR CULTURE: CURRENT LEGAL ISSUES 2004, at 87 (Michael 
Freeman ed., 2005). 
 188. E.g., U.S. CONST. pmbl. (“[T]o form a more perfect Union, establish Justice, insure 
domestic Tranquility, provide for the common defence, promote the general Welfare, and secure 
the Blessings of Liberty to ourselves and our Posterity . . . .”). 
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and if you have a fair lawyer, and nothing goes wrong with 
your witnesses or the jury, and you give up four or five 
days of time and some ten to thirty percent of the proceeds, 
and wait two to twenty months, you will probably get a 
judgment for a sum considerably less than what the 
performance would have been worth—which, if the other 
party is solvent and has not secreted his assets, you can in 
further due course collect with six percent interest for 
delay.189 
Llewellyn’s statement was suggestive but hardly exhaustive. 
Empirical studies of the American legal system demonstrate that his “if” 
clauses should be radically expanded to include a wide range of 
additional contingencies:190 
if you do not lack the knowledge or understanding 
necessary to realize that you have a cognizable legal claim 
to assert; and 
if filing suit would not put you at grave risk because your 
adversary is your employer, landlord, creditor, or other 
party able to dissuade you from your suit by the threat of 
                                                                                                                     
 189. LLEWELLYN, supra note 185, at 10. The quote originally appeared in Karl N. 
Llewellyn, A Realistic Jurisprudence—The Next Step, 30 COLUM. L. REV. 431, 437–38 (1930). 
190. There is a vast literature that shows the negative impact of a range of social factors on 
the ability of injured or aggrieved persons to assert and prevail on claims. Much of this literature 
is summarized under topical headings in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF EMPIRICAL LEGAL 
RESEARCH (Peter Cane & Herbert M. Kritzer eds., 2010). For specific studies, see, for example, 
KRISTIN BUMILLER, THE CIVIL RIGHTS SOCIETY: THE SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION OF VICTIMS (1988); 
DAVID M. ENGEL & FRANK W. MUNGER, RIGHTS OF INCLUSION: LAW AND IDENTITY IN THE LIFE 
STORIES OF AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES 245–49 (2003); MARK PEFFLEY & JON HURWITZ, 
JUSTICE IN AMERICA: THE SEPARATE REALITIES OF BLACKS AND WHITES (2010); Catherine 
Albiston, The Rule of Law and the Litigation Process: The Paradox of Losing by Winning, 33 
LAW & SOC’Y REV. 869 (1999); Ellen Berrey et al., Situated Justice: A Contextual Analysis of 
Fairness and Inequality in Employment Discrimination Litigation, 46 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 1 
(2012); Rachel Kahn Best et al., Multiple Disadvantages: An Empirical Test of Intersectionality 
Theory in EEO Litigation, 45 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 991 (2011); Devon W. Carbado & Mitu 
Gulati, The Fifth Black Woman, 11 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 701 (2001); William L.F. 
Felstiner et al., The Emergence and Transformation of Disputes: Naming, Blaming, 
Claiming . . . , 15 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 631 (1981); Samuel R. Gross, Expert Evidence, 1991 WIS. 
L. REV. 1113; Cheryl I. Harris, Finding Sojourner’s Truth: Race, Gender, and the Institution of 
Property, 18 CARDOZO L. REV. 309 (1996); Anna-Maria Marshall, Idle Rights: Employees’ 
Rights Consciousness and the Construction of Sexual Harassment Policies, 39 LAW & SOC’Y 
REV. 83 (2005); Edward A. Purcell, Jr., Geography as a Litigation Weapon: Consumers, Forum-
Selection Clauses, and the Rehnquist Court, 40 UCLA L. REV. 423, 440–59 (1992); Caroll 
Seron et al., The Impact of Legal Counsel on Outcomes for Poor Tenants in New York City’s 
Housing Court: Results of a Randomized Experiment, 35 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 419 (2001); 
Virginia W. Wei, Note, Asian Women and Employment Discrimination: Using Intersectionality 
Theory to Address Title VII Claims Based on Combined Factors of Race, Gender and National 
Origin, 37 B.C. L. REV. 771 (1996). 
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extralegal but compelling social or economic sanctions 
against you; and  
if you possess the sophistication and resources necessary to 
locate and secure the services of an attorney capable—in 
reality--of handling your case effectively; and  
if social factors such as race, class, gender, ethnicity, 
educational level, sexual orientation, and other practical 
conditions and biases do not intimidate or otherwise 
prevent you from seeking a legal remedy; and 
if those same social factors and biases do not unfavorably 
influence the behavior of any of the personnel you confront 
in the litigation process or in the courthouse itself; and  
if your adversary has not used substantial resources to 
lobby and thereby successfully induced the legislature or 
the courts to impose heavier pleading or evidentiary 
requirements on your claim or to create legal immunities or 
defenses that block your suit; and  
if your claim does not involve an adhesion contract 
containing obscure technical provisions that you did not 
understand but that deprive you of a judicial forum capable 
of providing full relief or that compel you to litigate in an 
unfavorable forum, meet harsh procedural prerequisites for 
maintaining your suit, or limit the substantive scope or 
value of your claim; and  
if the continually mounting combination of risks, costs, 
delays, vexations, inconveniences, and uncertainties 
involved in discovery and motion practice does not exhaust 
your resources or wear you down psychologically; and 
if pressing medical bills, family obligations, or other 
financial hardships do not compel you to discount your 
claim steeply and settle it cheaply out of court before a trial 
date becomes available; 
then—and only then—you might win something which 
will, in any event, almost certainly be less than full 
compensation for your loss or injury.191 
                                                                                                                     
 191. The salience of these informal social factors may grow substantially as the number of 
trials in American courts continues to decline and the Supreme Court continues to deny access 
to the federal courts to more and more Americans. E.g., ROBERT P. BURNS, THE DEATH OF THE 
AMERICAN TRIAL (2009); Stephen B. Burbank, Vanishing Trials and Summary Judgment in 
Federal Civil Cases: Drifting Toward Bethlehem or Gomorrah?, 1 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 
591 (2004); Marc Galanter, The Vanishing Trial: An Examination of Trials and Related Matters 
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Legal positivism’s implicit and second “separation” thesis should 
force such “if” clauses to the center of our attention and highlight the 
necessity of examining with the greatest care the law’s social and 
behavioral features.192 Such scrutiny is essential to ensure that the law’s 
lofty democratic values and its noble constitutional principles—both its 
underlying morality and its formal rules—are honored not merely in 
soaring rhetoric but in actual practice. 
Second, legal positivism’s recognition of the “social” nature of law 
should warn theorists more broadly about the potentially misleading 
character of the classic distinction between law and morality, between 
the law that “is” and the law that “ought to be.”193 The traditional and 
sometimes intense debate over that issue deflected attention from 
pivotal aspects of the law’s “social” nature. Many legal realists insisted 
on the need to separate the “is” from the “ought” in studying the law, 
for example, but Fuller rejected the possibility of such a separation on 
the ground that the law’s constant process of “becoming” necessarily 
involved both.194 Moral views shaped the law, Fuller insisted, just as the 
law shaped moral views. Even if one accepts Fuller’s insight,195 it is 
                                                                                                                     
in Federal and State Courts, 1 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 459, 522–31 (2004); Jonah B. 
Gelbach, Note, Locking the Doors to Discovery? Assessing the Effects of Twombly and Iqbal on 
Access to Discovery, 121 YALE L.J. 2270 (2012). 
 192. Dworkin fairly criticized Hart for Hart’s inadequate theory of adjudication. “[I]t is 
worth asking,” Frederick Schauer notes, “whether a theory of law that does not include an 
account of adjudication can be a satisfactory theory of law for advanced democracies.” Schauer, 
supra note 114, at 875 n.79. One could also question, however, the importance of a theory of 
adjudication when only a minuscule fraction of disputes are ever “adjudicated.” E.g., BURNS, 
supra note 191; Galanter, supra note 191. More basically, one could ask how, and in what ways, 
“the law” itself is important under such circumstances. The familiar metaphor of “bargaining in 
the shadow of the law,” though inexact, suggests that the context and pressures of “bargaining” 
as well as the reach, intensity, and distortions of the “shadow” are at least as important as “the 
law” itself in shaping results. See, e.g., Robert H. Mnookin & Lewis Kornhauser, Bargaining in 
the Shadow of the Law: The Case of Divorce, 88 YALE L.J. 950 (1979). 
 193. By the beginning of the twenty-first century, theorists for the most part have 
abandoned the idea of a rigid distinction between the two. Most would likely agree with three 
rather unexceptional propositions: that there may be a difference between the law that “is” and 
the law that “ought to be”; that it might be uncertain in a given situation what the relevant law 
“is” or even whether there actually is any “existing” law on a point; and, that moral values and 
principles frequently shaped the law that “is.” 
 194. A “statute or decision [wa]s not a segment of being, but . . . a process of becoming,” 
and therefore “to distinguish sharply between the rule as it is, and the rule as it ought to be, is to 
resort to an abstraction foreign to the raw data which experience offers us.” FULLER, supra note 
49, at 10. Ronald Dworkin and Fuller’s colleague, Henry M. Hart, Jr., adopted similar views. 
See Henry M. Hart, Jr., Holmes’ Positivism—An Addendum, 64 HARV. L. REV. 929, 930 (1951); 
DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY, supra note 121, at 326–27. 
 195. Fuller did urge legal philosophers to “give up their endless debates about definitions” 
and to “turn instead to an analysis of the social processes that constitute the reality of law.” LON 
L. FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW 242 (rev. ed. 1969). His concept of the “social processes,” 
however, seemed to refer to broad ideas about human purposes and reasonable legal procedures 
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nonetheless essential to note that his focus on the role of moral values in 
the law’s “becoming” obscured the fact that “nonmoral” social factors 
also played a role in that dynamic process.196 The law’s process of 
“becoming,” in other words, includes a sweeping range of “nonmoral” 
forces that are likely to prove of equal, if not greater, importance than 
overtly “moral” ideas. Those “nonmoral” factors include ruthless 
lobbying efforts by waves of special-interests, strategic litigation 
campaigns by narrowly-focused pressure groups, massive and secret 
campaign contributions by organized and wealthy donors, and covert 
and self-seeking bargaining among political and institutional insiders.197 
Whatever the exact relationship between “law” and “morals,” then, 
the interaction between the two constitutes only one aspect of the law’s 
“becoming.” It is understandable why questions about the relationship 
between law and morality became particularly acute as a result of the 
horrors of Nazism, just as it is understandable why such questions 
remain vital in our own day, when profound moral disagreements over 
such issues as abortion and gay rights create acute legal and political 
divides. Nonetheless, moral controversies and changes in the society’s 
values remain just one of the many forces that drive the law’s evolution. 
Put to the service of democracy and constitutional government, legal 
positivism’s social orientation urges the careful study of far more than 
the role of “morals” in the law’s process of becoming. It also requires 
the careful study of the role of powerful and self-interested forces in the 
process and, further, a cold-eyed examination of the frequently 
inequitable social, economic, and political conditions that those forces 
too often impose on ordinary Americans.  
Finally, by highlighting the complex social nature of law, legal 
positivism warns theorists to avoid what is sometimes called “the 
autonomy of ideas,” a fallacy that frequently plagues those who focus 
                                                                                                                     
rather than to the specific social, political, economic, and institutional forces that worked to 
shape the law in the service of select and partisan interests. 
 196. Realists denied the charge that they discounted moral values and insisted that their 
work sought to bring about greater justice in the legal system. “The point is,” Jerome Frank 
declared, “that the rational and ethical factors are thwarted in their operations by the 
conventional tendency to ignore the non-rational and non-ethical factors.” Jerome Frank, Book 
Review, 40 YALE L.J. 1116, 1121 n.1 (1931) (reviewing K.N. LLEWELLYN, THE BRAMBLE BUSH: 
SOME LECTURES ON LAW AND ITS STUDY (1930)). “[T]he verification of theory by fact will not 
destroy but rather fortify the applicability of norms of Ought in the realm of reform, 
propaganda, and practical government.” (emphasis in original). Yntema, supra note 46, at 953. 
 197. For the growth of inequality in the United States and the disproportionate political 
influence of wealth on public policy, see, for example, LARRY M. BARTELS, UNEQUAL 
DEMOCRACY: THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF THE NEW GILDED AGE (2008); MARTIN GILENS, 
AFFLUENCE AND INFLUENCE: ECONOMIC INEQUALITY AND POLITICAL POWER IN AMERICA (2012); 
JACOB S. HACKER & PAUL PIERSON, WINNER-TAKE-ALL POLITICS: HOW WASHINGTON MADE THE 
RICH RICHER—AND TURNED ITS BACK ON THE MIDDLE CLASS (2010); Benjamin I. Page et al., 
Democracy and the Policy Preferences of Wealthy Americans, 11 PERSP. ON POL. 51 (2013). 
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on theory and philosophy. The fallacy lies in considering “ideas” as 
independent historical agents and assuming that they exert influences 
unmediated by social contexts or by the human beings who formulate, 
communicate, and exploit them. Thus, awareness of the fallacy should 
counsel against attempts to resolve the problem that some regard as the 
most pivotal practical issue that divides positivists from nonpositivists, 
the issue that the classic debate in the 1950s between Hart and Fuller 
placed in the spotlight.198  
A central question those two theorists debated was what difference it 
made, as a practical matter, whether one adopted a positivist or a natural 
law position on the “separation” thesis. Hart maintained that law and 
morals were separate and, consequently, that an “evil rule” must be 
recognized as “law” in a society if that society enforces that rule. 
Failure to separate law and morality promoted obscurantism and 
“romantic optimism,” whereas viewing them as separate prepared the 
way for a “powerful” form of “moral criticism.”  People should say, 
Hart declared, “that laws may be law but too evil to be obeyed.”199 
Fuller countered that, because law and morals could never truly be 
separated, one should not use the name “law” to dignify an “evil rule.” 
Laws, “even bad laws, have a claim to our respect” because our “ideal 
of fidelity to law” made such laws “something deserving loyalty.” Thus, 
Fuller insisted, allowing a society to give an “evil rule” the name of 
“law” would confer a degree of moral authority on that rule, lead people 
to believe that it must therefore be reasonable, and ultimately induce 
them to respect and obey it.200 Their contrary arguments pointed to two 
different risks: Hart underscored the danger that an excessively 
disobedient citizenry would spurn morally acceptable rules merely 
because they were personally burdensome or operationally imperfect, 
while Fuller stressed the obverse danger that an excessively placid 
citizenry would accept “evil rules” as morally proper and therefore 
binding.201  
Warning against the “autonomy of ideas,” positivism’s recognition 
of the social nature of law should immediately provoke two 
conclusions. First, the dispute between Hart and Fuller concerns the 
practical consequences of ideas and thus presents an empirical question 
that simply cannot be answered in the abstract or as a general matter. 
                                                                                                                     
 198. See, e.g., Norman E. Bowie, The ‘War’ Between Natural Law Philosophy and Legal 
Positivism, 4 IDEALISTIC STUD. 145 (1974); Liam Murphy, The Political Question of the 
Concept of Law, in HART’S POSTSCRIPT, supra note 114, at 371. 
 199. Hart, supra note 103, at 620. Hart’s charge echoed Bentham’s attack on Blackstone 
almost two centuries earlier. The failure to distinguish law and morality, Bentham argued, 
fostered a “spirit of obsequious quietism” that invariably led to an identification between “what 
is and what ought to be.” Murphy, supra note 198, at 387. 
 200. Fuller, supra note 103, at 632–33. 
 201. Neither, of course, denied that people should use moral values to test positive law or 
that the state might vigorously enforce “evil rules.” 
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Second, and as a result, neither Hart nor Fuller was convincing. If ideas 
are not “autonomous” but rather depend on social context and practical 
support, then the question whether a citizenry would tend to be 
rebellious or quiescent cannot be answered by unspooling some “logic” 
supposedly inherent in the citizenry’s real or imagined conception of 
law. Thus, the debate over the practical significance of the choice 
between legal positivism and natural law can hardly turn on which 
view, as a necessary and general matter, seems more desirable on some 
hypothetical Hart–Fuller “rebellious-quiescent scale.” Whatever 
practical results might follow from a choice of one view over the other, 
those consequences would not stem from any logic inherent in either of 
the two rival theories.202 They would stem from the society’s 
fundamental moral commitments, the nature of its specific political and 
institutional culture, and the extent to which it seeks fairly and honestly 
to honor those commitments and respect the integrity of that culture. 
Until we ask such “social” questions–and focus, in particular, on the 
role of both informal social power in the arena of legal practice and  the 
“nonmoral” forces that drive the law’s process of “becoming”—and 
until we answer those questions on the basis of satisfactory empirical 
evidence, we will not fully understand the role and significance in the 
law of either doctrinal rules or moral principles. Until we consistently 
ask and answer such questions, moreover, legal positivism will not 
fulfill its intellectual potential as a powerful support for those 
committed—on whatever moral grounds—to the twin causes of 
constitutionalism and democracy. 
CONCLUSION 
Legal positivism has no necessary relationship to either 
constitutionalism or democracy, but its core insight promises invaluable 
assistance to both. That insight teaches us that to understand our legal 
and political systems clearly, we must examine their practical 
operations in depth and detail. It warns us that, in spite of sound-bytes 
                                                                                                                     
 202. For a similar view, see Frederick Schauer, The Legality of Evil or the Evil of 
Legality?, 47 TULSA L. REV. 121, 131 (2011). In fairness to Hart, he himself seemed to suggest 
this point:  
[T]here is an extraordinary naïveté in the view that insensitiveness to the 
demands of morality and subservience to state power in a people like the 
Germans should have arisen from the belief that law might be law though it 
failed to conform with the minimum requirements of morality. Rather this 
terrible history prompts inquiry into why emphasis on the slogan “law is law,” 
and the distinction between law and morals, acquired a sinister character in 
Germany, but elsewhere, as with the Utilitarians themselves, went along with 
the most enlightened liberal attitudes. 
Hart, supra note 103, at 617–18. For Fuller’s version of the antipositivist charge, see Fuller, 
supra note 103, at 658–59. 
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and sloganeering, neither democracy nor constitutionalism necessarily 
or automatically works as its theory posits and that, to sustain and 
ensure the vitality of both, we must constantly and rigorously test our 
current institutional practices and their accompanying social 
consequences against those noble ideals.  
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